From panix!news.intercon.com!eddie.mit.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Sun Nov 28 17:26:44 EST 1993
Article: 5333 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <211306Z28111993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!eddie.mit.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 1993 21:10:02 UTC
Subject: Re: More questions for hermy
Lines: 37
apendrag@news.delphi.com (APENDRAGON@DELPHI.COM) writes:
>Sorry, but moral propositions are in a completely different universe
>from empirical observations.
There's only one universe.
>Which moral truths do not depend on particular features or choices of
>the knower?
The Golden Rule and the categorical imperative are examples.
>Rational is not a normative term. It refers to the ability to perform
>inductive and deductive reasoning.
It refers to the ability to do so correctly, and "correctness" is a
normative term. Also, inductive reasoning requires the ability to
construct theories and choose the theory that explains the evidence
best. The process is not mechanical or reducible to formal logic, and
the judgment that one person does it better than another is a normative
judgment.
If you believe that rationality is not a normative matter, and that it
belongs where moral judgments do not belong, in the same universe as
rocks, trees and neutrinos, why do you think it isn't studied by means
of the physical sciences?
[A review of the rest of your post convinces me our discussion isn't
going to get any farther, at least for the present. Very likely you'll
agree, but let me know if there's anything in particular you want me to
respond to. I'll post what I've written so far, and you can respond or
not as you choose.]
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From panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Sun Nov 28 19:08:45 EST 1993
Article: 5337 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <232307Z28111993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 28 Nov 1993 23:17:26 UTC
Subject: Re: The True history of SKINHEADS
Lines: 102
coomer@proton.Nuc.Berkeley.EDU (Eric Coomer) writes:
>>Within the past week I posted CDC
>>statistics showing that from the beginning of the epidemic to September
>>1993 they've been able to find only 705 American men who have gotten
>>AIDS from heterosexual contact with women not in one of the risk groups
>>(druggies and the like).
>
>You seriosly need to take a class on statistics. First of all, the CDC gets
>the majority of their data from free clinics that report their finding to
>them(the CDC). Couple the statistics of how many heteros are getting
>tested with how many homos and you'll get a clearer understanding of the
>problem. Most heteros don't believe that they are at risk due to the
>wonderful job the media has done of portraying aids as a "gay" disease.
>A much larger percentage of homos are getting tested than heteros. Therefore
>you are guarenteed skewed statistics. Eventually, statistics will catch
>up and begin to paint a more realistic picture of things.
What does testing have to do with it? These are people with AIDS, not
people who are HIV positive. When people develop AIDS it gets
diagnosed, and when it gets diagnosed it gets reported and added to the
CDC statistics. Even if there are some cases that don't get reported,
705 cases is not enough to suggest a serious health worry. (Note: the
705 cases is among white men, who seemed to be the group at issue in
the posting my original posting in this thread was commenting on.)
The media have been promising us heterosexual AIDS for years. Instead,
we still have what we've had in this country from the beginning, AIDS
among male homosexuals and IV drug users and to a much lesser extent
among those (especially women) who have sexual intercourse with such
people and among hemophiliacs. You can't have it both ways. You can't
say "it's a disease that's really, really hard to get, so it's *crazy*
to be worried if someone you're in contact with is infected" and
"everyone's at risk, even the vast majority who don't do the few and
well-defined things that experience shows are likely to lead to
transmission".
Maybe it's worth reposting the stats:
CDC HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT
Third Quarter 1993
U.S. AIDS Cases Reported Through September 1993
Online Edition: Issued Monday, November 1, 1993
Report Description
The U.S. AIDS case data presented below are extracted from the
"HIV/AIDS/ Survillance Report", published each quarter by the
Division of HIV/AIDS, Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333. In addition to
the data presented here, the printed report contains maps, figures,
and technical notes. Single copies of the printed report are
available from:
CDC National AIDS Clearinghouse
P.O. Box 6003
Rockville, MD 20849-6003
1-800-458-5231
1-800-243-7012 (TTY/TDD)
[deletions]
Table 4. Male adult/adolescent AIDS cases by exposure category and
race/ethnicity, reported October 1992 through September 1993,(1)
and cumulative totals, through September 1993, United States
White, not
Hispanic
Oct. 1992- Cumulative
Sept. 1993 total
Exposure category No. (%) No. (%)
Men who have sex with men 30,094 (73) 125,392 (78)
Injecting drug use 4,285 (10) 12,670 ( 8)
Men who have sex with men
and inject drugs 3,001 ( 7) 11,959 ( 7)
Hemophilia/coagulation disorder 794 ( 2) 2,349 ( 1)
Heterosexual contact: 607 ( 1) 1,654 ( 1)
Sex with injecting drug user 227 804
Sex with person with hemophilia 6 13
Born in Pattern-II(2) country 1 8
Sex with person born
in Pattern-II country 10 52
Sex with transfusion recipient
with HIV infection 25 72
Sex with HIV-infected person,
risk not specified 338 705
Receipt of blood transfusion,
blood components, or tissue 431 ( 1) 2,519 ( 2)
Risk not identified(3) 2,032 ( 5) 4,380 ( 3)
Total 41,244 (100) 160,923 (100)
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From panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Mon Nov 29 06:06:34 EST 1993
Article: 5341 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <023307Z29111993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 02:25:39 UTC
Subject: Re: More questions for hermy
Lines: 76
apendrag@news.delphi.com (APENDRAGON@DELPHI.COM) writes:
>We could probably end this kind of discussion by your recognition of
>this proposition:
>
> "Whites have a right to nationhood and for self-determination"
I have doubts about the proposition, but I don't think they have that
much to do with the abstract issues we keep sliding into. To my mind,
the issues include the following:
1. How many Whites are there, in your sense of a group for whom
Whiteness constitutes a fully satisfactory and comprehensive social and
political outlook?
2. Are Whites a cohesive and stable enough group to establish a
successful state?
3. Whites are scattered all over the United States. How would
partition be carried out?
4. Are there less radical means that would adequately deal with the
concerns that lead people to think of themselves as Whites?
5. What happens to relations among other ethnic groups and whites who
aren't Whites (the great majority, since you set such a demanding
standard for Whiteness)?
In general, my view is that a diversely multiethnic and multicultural
society like the post-1960's United States should be loosely organized
so that the different groups that compose it can develop their own ways
of life. The alternatives are (1) to force the way of life of one
group on everyone, or (2) to allow people to organize their lives only
in accordance with principles that are recognized as valid by all
cultures, which are permitted to receive social support, and principles
that are purely personal, which receive no social support. Neither
alternative seems practical.
>From that general view it follows that antidiscrimination laws have to
go, so that people can live as members of particular ethnic societies
with respect to the educational and economic aspects of their lives.
The welfare system also has to go, since the effect of that system is to
make some groups pay the bills for the unproductive or destructive
aspects of the way of life of other groups. Also, my view would require
major changes in the system of public education -- maybe a voucher
system with no disqualification if a school discriminates on ethnic or
religious grounds. Education is education for a way of life, and if it
is accepted that there is no single American way of life then there can
be no single American educational system.
I am not sure that political separation is necessary or even desirable.
For one thing, the ethnic and cultural picture here is extremely
complicated. We have both Whites and the far more numerous whites.
Among the whites we have divisions by section, national origin,
religion. class and so on. The blacks and others also have their
divisions. Some unifying principles (religion, section, class,
occupation, social values) cut across ethnic lines. There is no
geographical separation among ethnic groups. Under the circumstances,
it seems to me that the best thing for government to do would be to let
people establish and rely on connections to other people based on
whatever ties they find deepest and most reliable. Basically, that
means minimal government.
It's possible, of course, that my "live and let live/let 1000 flowers
bloom" system wouldn't work. The liberals are all convinced that
antidiscrimination laws and the like are essential to social stability
in the United States, and maybe they're right. Also, I'm not sure that
whites and blacks will ever be able to live happily as part of the same
political society. So maybe at some point it will come to partition.
But why rush to adopt radical measures? In other places partition has
been a mess, and I don't see why we would do better here.
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From panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Mon Nov 29 09:34:48 EST 1993
Article: 5348 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <120311Z29111993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1993 12:00:48 UTC
Subject: Re: More questions for hermy
Lines: 24
rawatts@unix.amherst.edu (WATTS) writes:
>: "Whites have a right to nationhood and for self-determination"
>:
>This would be an acceptable statement if you did not prioritize "white"
>rights. True, perhaps whites have rights to nationhood, so long as it
>does not infringe upon the rights of others. Thus, if a white state is
>to be founded, it must be in a place where no rights will be infringed
>upon. Perhaps Antartica, as someone suggested in an earlier post.
Does "infringement upon the rights of others" include only those things
that prioritize white rights? If so, would it be OK if whites or
Whites exercised their right to self-determination by preferentially
dealing with each other (that is, engaging in racial discrimination)
within a system of private property and free contract that permits
others to do the same? By working for the repeal of the 14th and 15th
amendments and the conversion of Vermont into a white homeland within a
federal system that permits (for example) blacks to do the same in
Detroit or Alabama?
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From panix!news.intercon.com!udel!news.sprintlink.net!uunet!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Tue Nov 30 05:00:21 EST 1993
Article: 5364 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <063302Z30111993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!udel!news.sprintlink.net!uunet!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1993 06:29:38 UTC
Subject: Re: More questions for hermy
Lines: 51
rawatts@unix.amherst.edu (WATTS) writes:
>: >: "Whites have a right to nationhood and for self-determination"
>: >:
>: >This would be an acceptable statement if you did not prioritize "white"
>: >rights.
>
>: Does "infringement upon the rights of others" include only those things
>: that prioritize white rights? If so, would it be OK if whites or
>: Whites exercised their right to self-determination by preferentially
>: dealing with each other (that is, engaging in racial discrimination)
>: within a system of private property and free contract that permits
>: others to do the same? By working for the repeal of the 14th and 15th
>: amendments and the conversion of Vermont into a white homeland within a
>: federal system that permits (for example) blacks to do the same in
>: Detroit or Alabama?
>
>No. It includes any actions which limit or take away the rights of
>others not defined as a part of the "group".
But any claim to group self-determination does that. When the United
States of America declared independence from Great Britain we converted
all the people who lived in Great Britain into aliens (and enemy aliens
at that) and thereby limited and reduced their rights compared to what
they had been previously. We also reduced (and even eliminated) the
rights of Tories to live here while maintaining their self-
identification as British subjects. Even today, by limiting citizenship
to those who were born or naturalized in the United States or are the
children of citizens, we limit the rights of those not defined as part
of the group.
>To answer your second point, in the examples you give neither whites
>nor blacks are correct. One's own "racial rights" (a ridiculous
>concept really, almost as ridiculous as the concept of race itself) may
>be promoted only if it does not impinge upon the "racial rights" of
>others.
Why are "rights as a white American" more ridiculous than "rights as an
American" (Americans have had an independent country for more than 200
years) or "rights as a Slovak" (the Slovaks are an ethnic group that
recently attained independence, so far as I know for the first time
ever). Are "American" and "Slovak" OK categories, while "white
American" is not? If so, why? Also, how would the partitioning of the
United States on ethnic lines result in the rights of one ethnic group
infringing the rights of other ethnic groups if each group gets a
piece?
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From panix!not-for-mail Tue Nov 30 15:50:29 EST 1993
Article: 996 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Nobility and Analogous Traditional Elites
Date: 30 Nov 1993 05:25:21 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 18
Message-ID: <2df72h$ssd@panix.com>
References: <1993Nov30.023628.29335@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
wbralick@nyx.cs.du.edu (William Bralick) writes:
>Greetings! Has anyone read the new book by Prof Plinio Correa de
>Oliveira, _Nobility and Analogous Traditional Elites in the
>Allocutions of Pius XII_? It is well-researched and delightfully
>anti-egalitarian.
I've never read anything by the man, in spite of including so many of
his writings in the a.r.c. resource list. Can you say anything about
him in general? Also, where are his books to be found?
By the way, congratulations on your nyx account. I hope this means your
posting problems are over.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Dec 1 18:01:59 EST 1993
Article: 11056 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: _A Theory of Justice_
Date: 1 Dec 1993 18:01:10 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 35
Message-ID: <2dj7nm$k9n@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:17706 talk.philosophy.misc:11056
After years of relying on hearsay I've finally started to read _A Theory
of Justice_, and am having trouble with some basics. The following are
some of my confusions. I would be grateful for any comments, even "keep
turning the pages".
1. The basic rules of society have a powerful effect on what plan of
life a person is able or likely to adopt. Why do the people behind the
veil of ignorance treat their unknown plans of life as a given when they
obviously aren't given but will be profoundly affected by the decisions
they are making regarding basic social structure? Why don't Rawls'
people make it their priority to establish institutions that lead to
adoption of maximally rational plans of life that support each other
rather than institutions that give equal support to the realization of
whatever plans of life they turn out actually to have?
2. Rawls says liberty has priority over social welfare, and also treats
the material goods produced in a society as in principle available for
distribution among the members of society without regard to who produced
them. These two principles don't seem to sit together easily, because
the production of material goods is normally something that happens
because particular people choose to produce them so they can use them
for purposes of their own. It appears that the liberty that has
priority over welfare does not include liberty to bring about some end
if a constituent of the end is the creation of value that the government
could take and give to someone else. The limitation seems arbitrary to
me.
3. Is there a simple and clear argument to show why the people behind
the veil of ignorance would choose the maximin principle? I don't
understand what Rawls says on the subject.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 2 11:18:08 EST 1993
Article: 11065 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: _A Theory of Justice_
Date: 2 Dec 1993 11:17:20 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 60
Message-ID: <2dl4eg$po3@panix.com>
References: <2dj7nm$k9n@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:17749 talk.philosophy.misc:11065
In an earlier posting I listed three points on which I have a hard time
seeing the justification for the views set forth in _A Theory of
Justice_. A fourth issue is how Rawls can emphasize self-respect while
apparently rejecting the notion of just deserts. (He rejects "just
deserts" at least in connection with the acquisition of wealth, and the
reasons he gives for rejecting it there seem equally applicable
elsewhere.) I would have thought that self-respect is something people
view themselves as earning by measuring up to standards and so
deserving respect. Any comments?
I've had no response so far to my earlier posting. Maybe it would
arouse Rawlsians or sympathizers to respond if I also posted something
abusing liberalism on issues irrelevant to its validity. It's hard to
abuse liberalism except from the left without coming across as a crank,
but that's life. The following is a restatement of a hobbyhorse I've
ridden before:
Liberalism as a Ruling Class Plot
It seems evident that American democracy does not mean rule by
the people. A body of persons can rule only if it can make decisions,
and it becomes harder to do so to the extent the body becomes larger and
more diverse and the decisions more all-embracing and complex. It
follows that an economically and socially diverse, multiethnic and
multicultural population of 250 million stretched out over half a
continent is not going to be able to control a government that exercises
broad powers to reform the basic structures and regulate the details of
social life.
It also seems evident that such powers make no sense unless they are
exercised in a coherent fashion. Therefore, it is a fundamental
interest of the people who influence or exercise government power to
make sense of their own position by finding some way to coordinate their
actions. Since there is no external authority that can do the
coordination [<-- any comments on key assumption?], it appears that the
only solution for such people is to develop class consciousness and an
ideology that guides and gives coherence to their actions. People being
as they are, the ideology they adopt will very likely also justify and
reinforce their power.
The most eligible ideology for these purposes is liberalism. Any
ideology must be justified today by appealing to liberty and equality.
What is needed, then, is a way to claim to be establishing liberty and
equality while creating dependency and reinforcing the power of those
who control the state. The liberal answer is to make each citizen as
independent as possible from his fellows, as little responsible as
possible for the consequences of his acts, and as dependent as possible
on the state. Once that has been done there will be liberty and
equality of a sort, since the citizens will be free and equal as to
each other, but the position of the ruling class will be unassailable
because they will have no possible competitors for power. The ruling
class will also have plenty of very important things to do, so their
existence, activities and power will be justified in their own eyes.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 2 14:34:22 EST 1993
Article: 3720 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: PC as a condition of employment
Date: 2 Dec 1993 14:34:03 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 26
Message-ID: <2dlfvb$3h1@panix.com>
References: <2dl5v8$2fs@zeus.london.micrognosis.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
ahumphr@micrognosis.co.uk (Aidan Humphreys) writes:
>How would you respond to attempts to make PC attitudes and a condition
>of employment.
Start a revolution? Become an independent contractor who works at
home? I don't know how things are in the U.K., but it's all but
required by current civil rights law here in the U.S. All a plaintiff
has to do to make his case in a discrimination suit is show that an
employer is hiring or promoting disproportionately few blacks, women or
whatever (I think "disproportionately few" means "less than 80% of the
group's share of the relevant candidate pool"). Then the burden is on
the employer to prove innocence, and it's hard for employers to do that
when the numbers are wrong without a showing that they have their
hearts in the right place and are trying in good faith to eradicate
racism, sexism and so on from their organization. It's hard to do that
unless they do something about the people in the organization who don't
have the right outlook. In addition, "sexual harassment" here can
include expressing the wrong attitude if it makes a woman feel she's in
a hostile environment, so employers can get into trouble if they hire
people who think the wrong way about the relations between the sexes.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Dec 3 09:14:00 EST 1993
Article: 11083 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.politics.theory,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: _A Theory of Justice_
Date: 3 Dec 1993 09:12:36 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 91
Message-ID: <2dnhgk$fsi@panix.com>
References: <2dj7nm$k9n@panix.com> <2dmn4u$97k@Chart.McRCIM.McGill.EDU>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix talk.politics.theory:17814 talk.philosophy.misc:11083
michael@CIM.McGill.CA (Michael Lee) writes:
>we, under a `veil of ignorance' do not know our strengths and
>weaknesses relative to others, are asked to formulate this social
>contract. Under this condition, how much would you invest for any
>given set of social institutions? How much of your resources would you
>be willing to invest in societal structures which ensure economic and
>social equity or structures which ensure maximal liberty. In the
>former case, if you were the weakest, you would have something to
>gain, and lose if you were the strongest, and vice versa for the
>latter case. However, you don't know where you stand relative to
>others. The question is following: what would a rational person
>choose?
We don't know our strengths and weaknesses, our places in society, or
our conceptions of the good, and the question is what social contract we
would agree to under those circumstances if we were rational. Rawls
seems to think that behind the veil it would be rational for me to worry
about the bad things that might happen if I were weak or ended up in a
bad position in the social hierarchy, but not about the bad things that
might happen if I ended up with a conception of the good that was either
bad in itself or difficult or impossible to achieve because of conflicts
with conceptions held by other people. I don't understand the
limitation. It seems to me that the consequences of weakness, the
nature of the social hierarchy and the conceptions of the good that
people form could all be profoundly affected by the terms of the social
contract. If that's right, why wouldn't someone rational behind the
veil of ignorance worry about all three?
>: It appears that the liberty that has
>: priority over welfare does not include liberty to bring about some end
>: if a constituent of the end is the creation of value that the government
>: could take and give to someone else. The limitation seems arbitrary to
>: me.
>Rawls has always argued from a postion of equality, liberty to Rawls is
>constrained to a system which promotes liberty for all from a
>standpoint of liberal, which is different from a libertarian. He is
>not in any way endorsing a libertarian idealogy nor using liberty in
>that sense. In Rawls' system social and economic inequalities are
>geared so that the weaker have the advantage.
I don't understand saying that people have liberty, and liberty is very
important and takes precedence over everything else, but the "liberty"
that gets the favored position does not include the liberty to do things
that advance one's personal ends and do not injure others. Admittedly,
Rawls does not say that in general, but that's in effect what he says
when an intermediate step in advancing one's ends is producing something
that the government could take away and give to someone else. That may
be (as you suggest) the liberal conception of liberty. If so, it does
seem arbitrary to me.
Maybe an example would help. You and I both value looking good over
anything else. Your idea of how to look good is to sculpt the perfect
body by spending all your free time doing isometric exercises that don't
require any equipment. Mine is to take a second job to get extra money
to buy the perfect wardrobe. Rawls seems to say that what you do is
superprotected because it's liberty but what I do is presumptively bad
because it's economic inequality. That seems arbitrary unless the
perfect body is a better conception of the good than the perfect
wardrobe, but Rawls seems unwilling to rank conceptions of the good.
(See my first point.)
>: 3. Is there a simple and clear argument to show why the people behind
>: the veil of ignorance would choose the maximin principle?
>
>An analogy that one can draw is that to ensure greatest possibility of
>each person receiving a fair piece of the pie is to have the person
>cutting the pie completely ignorant of which piece s/he will recieve.
>Under these conditions, a rational being will cut equal shares of the
>pie, in other words, choose the maximal principle of equality. You
>can reduce the above to a party of two, where one cuts the pie into
>two portions and the other gets to choose the portion.
The analogy assumes the pie already exists before the scheme for
dividing it is set up, and also that rationality requires fairness as
equality (which is what has to be shown). If some scheme other than
equal shares meant a 30% chance of getting a somewhat smaller piece and
a 70% chance of getting a substantially larger piece because the
inequalities would promote production, why would it be rational to go
for equal shares? Even if the pie stayed the same size or shrank as a
result of the unequal shares scheme, but one might get a bigger piece,
why would it be irrational to go for it? Someone might think that a
chance of something outstandingly good is better than the assurance of
something mediocre, and I'm not sure why such a preference would be
irrational.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Dec 4 07:27:58 EST 1993
Article: 11097 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Lies, Damn Lies, and Merrill-Lynch
Date: 4 Dec 1993 05:40:45 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 35
Message-ID: <2dppfd$noa@panix.com>
References: <931204.06088.EGNILGES@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
EGNILGES@delphi.com writes:
>Recently, I saw an ad from the borkerage house Merrill-Lynch which
>shows clearly how debased public communication has become. The ad
>purported to show "how much of YOUR income goes in taxes", with
>the false intimacy of "your" that pretends to know just what I
>think about taxes. For each state, it listed the MARGINAL tax rates:
>the rates, of course, on the LAST dollar earned [ . . . ] unprincipled
>lies by companies desirous of flogging financial products.
For a financial product like a tax-exempt bond the marginal rate is the
right number. If my income is made up of $50K salary and $1K
investment income, all fully taxed, and a financial product eliminates
all tax on the $1K, the tax savings would be determined by reference to
my marginal rate. It would have been more accurate if Merrill had said
"marginal income" instead of income, but it's hard to demand that a
copywriter use language that most people don't understand.
I suppose your point is that the wording was intended to exacerbate
people's feelings that their taxes are too high and turn those feelings
into a motivation to buy the product, and that annoys you because you
think taxes are not too high. That's fair enough as a point about
advertising in general, that advertisers are unprincipled rhetoricians
who appeal to whatever beliefs and attitudes they think people actually
have without concern for whether the beliefs and attitudes are
justified. Is this really an egregious example, though? The words
used were at least defensible in an explanation of a product to people
who are not financial analysts, and on the policy issue the view that
government ought to spend and tax less might be wrong but it doesn't
strike me as monstrous or crazy.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"If we only wanted to be happy it would be easy; but we want to be
happier than other people, which is almost always difficult, since we
think them happier than they are." (Montesquieu)
From panix!cmcl2!yale.edu!newsserver.jvnc.net!howland.reston.ans.net!cs.utexas.edu!not-for-mail Sat Dec 4 10:54:29 EST 1993
Article: 8511 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!cmcl2!yale.edu!newsserver.jvnc.net!howland.reston.ans.net!cs.utexas.edu!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Kant and duty
Date: 4 Dec 1993 07:41:46 -0600
Organization: UTexas Mail-to-News Gateway
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"Lincoln R. Carr" writes:
>A decision is one's own only insofar as one determines it for oneself.
>The more one uses one's reasoning abilities, the more one is involved
>in the decision making process. So, one is a slave only when one does
>NOT use reason to follow duty.
Part of the issue is what things are external to oneself, which seems
to depend on notions of essential human nature. If you think that your
capacity to reason formally is the thing that makes you what you are,
then you will think that following the categorical imperative is the
freest thing you can do because it is acting in accordance with your
true nature rather than some foreign influence. If you think that what
is most fundamentally important about you is that you can know the will
of God, or experience pleasure, or realize whatever your will happens
to be, your notion of freedom will vary accordingly.
This discussion has inspired me to change my .sig. It seems that in the
view of George Sevile, Marquis of Halifax, reason on occasion appears
external to some people. (He didn't have the benefit of reading Kant,
however.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Dec 4 21:28:13 EST 1993
Article: 1032 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Diversity
Date: 4 Dec 1993 19:20:42 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 30
Message-ID: <2dr9gq$nq3@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Here's an extract from Ortega y Gasset's "Unity and Diversity of Europe"
in his _History as a System_:
"But of greater interest to us in [J.S.] Mill is his anxiety over
the pernicious kind of homogeneity that he saw growing throughout
the West. It was this that moved him to seek refuge in a great
thought expressed by Humboldt in his youth, that if mankind is to be
enriched, to consolidate and perfect itself, there must exist a
"variety of situations." Within each nation and in the aggregate of
nations there must be a diversity of circumstances, so that when one
possibility fails others remain open. It is sheer madness to stake
all Europe on one card, on a single type of man, on one identical
"situation." Europe's secret talent up to the present day has been
to avoid this [ . . . ]
"The course on which we are now embarked, with its progressive
lessening of the "variety of situations," leads us directly back to
the Lower Empire, also a period of masses and of frightful
homogeneity. As early as in the time of the Antonines there had
become apparent a strange phenomenon that has been less stressed and
analyzed than it deserves: men had become stupid. The process had
its roots farther back. The Stoic Posidonius, Cicero's teacher, is
supposed with some reason to have been the last of the ancients
capable of facing facts with an open and active mind [ . . . ]"
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!news.intercon.com!uhog.mit.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Sun Dec 5 06:39:02 EST 1993
Article: 5540 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <032303Z05121993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!uhog.mit.edu!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!pipex!sunic!trane.uninett.no!news.eunet.no!nuug!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 1993 03:14:37 UTC
Subject: Re: The Inconsequential Ravings of Two Interracists
Lines: 62
Xref: panix alt.skinheads:5540 alt.revisionism:5800
smithmc@mentor.cc.purdue.edu (Lost Boy) writes:
>Fact: according to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services,
>children of asian and mixed-race heritage tend to perform much better
>in school than white (European-heritage) and black (African-heritage)
>children. There is evidence to support the hypothesis that this is
>due to cultural conditions, but suppose that we were to use that hypothesis
>that the primary motive behind excellence in school is genetic heritage.
>Would we not then have to conclude that Asian and mixed-race children
>are genetically superior with regards to ability to learn abstract
>concepts than "racially pure" whites or blacks? Would this not then
>support the hypothesis that Asians are in at least some ways genetically
>superior to whites, and that "race-mixing" creates a better "breed" of
>human?
There was an article in _National Review_ a couple of years ago
reviewing the evidence and concluding:
1. On average, blacks score substantially (one standard deviation)
worse than whites on standardized intelligence tests.
2. East Asians score significantly better than whites on average, but
the difference is much less than the white/black difference and the
variation is less among East Asians than among whites, so that more
whites than East Asians get very high scores.
3. These differences are stable over time and for the most part can't
be explained away as the results of other circumstances that can be
controlled for (like education and class).
4. The usual complaints against intelligence tests (cultural bias,
irrelevance to real-world performance) don't seem to hold water. Such
tests are very good predictors of scholastic and occupational success
for blacks, whites and East Asians, and in particular don't underpredict
black success (which they would if they were biased against blacks).
If these conclusions are accurate, and if the racial differences in
average tested intelligence correspond mostly to genetic differences in
average innate intelligence, I don't think it would support your
recommendation of racial mixing. Greater average intelligence doesn't
necessarily mean across-the-board superiority, so something might well
be lost if a racial group with less average intelligence lost its racial
distinctiveness. In addition, there is more to ethnicity than genes,
and too much mixing would likely lead to a decline in cultural
distinctiveness which might also cause irreparable losses.
To my mind, the big concern resulting from all this is the future of
white/black relations in this country. Blacks resent having less and
don't like imputations of inferiority. On the other hand, the evidence
summarized above suggests that the only way we're going to get
substantial social and economic equality between whites and blacks is
through a permanent system of preferential treatment for blacks on a
scale much larger than the affirmative action programs of today. I
can't imagine how such a program could be compatible with either a free
society or mutual respect between blacks and whites. So in the long run
it seems likely to me that separation of the races would be best for all
concerned.
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From panix!news.intercon.com!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Sun Dec 5 10:29:36 EST 1993
Article: 5544 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <134303Z05121993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Sun, 5 Dec 1993 13:42:13 UTC
Subject: Re: The Inconsequential Ravings of Two Interracists
Lines: 79
Xref: panix alt.skinheads:5544 alt.revisionism:5810
bzs@ussr.std.com (Barry Shein) writes:
[Note: I've deleted a lot, I hope without distorting the argument]
>>4. The usual complaints against intelligence tests (cultural bias,
>>irrelevance to real-world performance) don't seem to hold water. Such
>>tests are very good predictors of scholastic and occupational success
>>for blacks, whites and East Asians, and in particular don't underpredict
>>black success (which they would if they were biased against blacks).
>
>The problem is whether or not the tests are basically tautological and
>something else is the problem, the word "intelligence" is so
>trivialized and seductive.
>
>For example, let's say the test had exactly one question: What color
>most closely matches your skin? Ok, most black children would choose a
>very few of the shades, mostly quite different than white children.
>
>Now we match that up with success later in life and lo and behold it's
>a great predictor! Kids that chose those darker shades are indeed less
>successful, on average, than kids who chose the lighter shades.
Your point seems to be that the "intelligence" measured by an IQ test
may be a standin for something else that has no connection with our
usual idea of intelligence. If so, it would be nice to have a theory as
to what that other thing is since it is the best single predictor of
success for both blacks and whites. I take it that skin color (your
example) would be a much poorer predictor, if only because it wouldn't
be useful as a predictor within racial groups.
If you look at an intelligence test it looks like a test of reasoning
ability. The people who have been designing, evaluating and
redesigning them for the past century have intended to test reasoning
ability and believed they were doing so. The tests are more useful
than anything else in predicting performance in academic and employment
situations in which one would think reasoning ability leads to success.
Why isn't it most reasonable to conclude that the tests on the whole
succeed in measuring something closely related to what we normally
think of as intelligence? Do you think that there is such a thing as
reasoning ability? If so, how would you go about distinguishing people
who have more of it from people who have less of it?
>By saying that kids who do more poorly on these tests do poorly later
>in life says absolutely nothing reliable about intelligence, it may
>well say that we can unfortunately select out those who do more poorly
>later in life quite early. Perhaps some sort of damage has been done
>already and the tests are only revealing this.
Here you seem to be saying that the cause of success or failure in life
that is tested by intelligence tests may be some quality that is present
quite early but is environmentally caused rather than innate. It's
possible, for example, that intelligence tests might measure something
that it's reasonable to call intelligence, but differences in
intelligence (especially between racial groups) might be environmental
rather than genetic.
The black/white gap in measured intelligence has been quite stable for
a great many years, and so far no one has been able to show
environmental causes for any large part of it. These considerations,
together with your observation that the gap appears at quite an early
age, suggest that the cause, whatever it is, goes rather deep, that no
one knows how it could be done away with, and that the gap is very
likely to stay with us for the foreseeable future. If so, I don't
think it matters much from the standpoint of policy whether the gap is
genetic or not. As long as whatever intelligence tests measure is and
remains strongly correlated to success I also don't think it matters
much whether it is "intelligence" or not. In either case blacks on
average are going to continue to be very substantially less successful
socially and economically than whites unless they are made permanent
beneficiaries of a system of preferential treatment on a scale vastly
greater than today's affirmative action programs. I think racial
separation would be better than the latter outcome for both blacks and
whites. If people, for whatever reason, can't live together happily
and the problem isn't going to go away they should separate.
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From panix!not-for-mail Sun Dec 5 16:40:58 EST 1993
Article: 8516 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Kant and duty
Date: 5 Dec 1993 16:40:26 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 37
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2dtkga$7hp@panix.com>
References: <199312041341.AA09635@panix.com> <1993Dec5.143017.17527@news.cs.indiana.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
"Lincoln R. Carr" writes:
>Kant is very good at making his distinctions. He states that ANY
>system that is both rational and autonomous has a duty to follow the
>categorical imperative [ . . . ] The problem that follows from trying
>to draw the system boundary is what constitutes autonomy. A hard
>determinist, for example, would say that one's actions are completely
>determined from so-called external forces and that there is no such
>thing as real autonomy. If this is true, any discussion of ethics, at
>least in the sense that it is normally discussed, is pointless.
>
>Kant responds that whether a being is autonomous is unknowable.
>However, it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE, thereby preserving the discussion of
>ethics, that the actions of a being, no matter how much they appear to
>be bound up in the world's causal chain, can be SELF-CAUSED.
>From what you say, and from my own hazy recollections, it seems that
Kant identifies rationality and autonomy, so that to act rationally and
to act freely are necessarily the same. But I don't see why there
couldn't be a being with an arbitrary will determined by nothing but
itself that would act autonomously by doing whatever it happened to
choose to do. The notion that we act autonomously only when we act
rationally seems odd to me. What qualifies a person as a moral agent
is that the person can choose whether he will follow the moral law.
That seems to show that even when the person chooses not to follow the
moral law his choice is attributable to him rather than some external
cause, and since the choice is attributable to him he is acting
autonomously in making it.
Somehow I suspect that the foregoing mostly shows that I should reread
the _Grundlagen_, and I intend to do so. You can comment if you think
it worth your while.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Dec 5 20:36:59 EST 1993
Article: 8518 of sci.philosophy.meta
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.meta
Subject: Re: Kant and duty
Date: 5 Dec 1993 20:36:22 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 22
Distribution: inet
Message-ID: <2du2am$5r@panix.com>
References: <1993Dec5.143017.17527@news.cs.indiana.edu> <2dtkga$7hp@panix.com> <1993Dec5.181007.23547@news.cs.indiana.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
"Lincoln R. Carr" writes:
>Rationality and autonomy are by no means identical. It is well within the
>scope of my imagination to conceive of beings who have one but not the other.
Do you think that was Kant's view? A very quick shuffle through the
_Grundlagen_ suggests the contrary to me. For starters, if they are
different then it seems that acting morally and acting freely are also
different.
>Most of the material that I found on Kant's resolution of freedom and
>causality is in _The Critique of Pure Reason_ way back around page 400
>or so of the Norman Kemp Smith translation. I can find explicit
>references if you need them.
If it's convenient to you, references would help. I have the N.K.S.
translation.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!news.intercon.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Mon Dec 6 04:50:43 EST 1993
Article: 5563 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <022329Z06121993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!sunic!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 02:21:33 UTC
Subject: Re: ANA News Update
Lines: 17
Xref: panix alt.skinheads:5563 alt.revisionism:5836
bryner@chemistry.utah.edu (Roger Bryner) writes:
>Who will our jews be. The homeless, The aids victim? They engage in
>high risk behavior. They are worthless people. We should make them
>pay their fair share.
Jews in Germany in 1933-1945 would have been happy if there hadn't been
any government programs that dealt with them specifically. Are you
worried that the government in the U.S. are going to deal with the
homeless and people with AIDS in a way that is less favorable than
ignoring them and simply applying to them the laws applicable to
everyone else?
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From panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi Mon Dec 6 07:19:09 EST 1993
Article: 5576 of alt.skinheads
Message-ID: <112306Z06121993@anon.penet.fi>
Path: panix!news.intercon.com!udel!darwin.sura.net!howland.reston.ans.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!uunet!EU.net!news.eunet.fi!anon.penet.fi
Newsgroups: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
From: an48213@anon.penet.fi (The Scarlet Pumpernickel)
X-Anonymously-To: alt.skinheads,alt.revisionism
Organization: Anonymous contact service
Reply-To: an48213@anon.penet.fi
Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1993 11:21:59 UTC
Subject: Re: The Inconsequential Ravings of Two Interracists
Lines: 31
Xref: panix alt.skinheads:5576 alt.revisionism:5855
bzs@ussr.std.com (Barry Shein) writes:
>I said that it's just as likely that we're measuring motivation in
>general and that a kid that's already been "beat down" by life (and
>that this can surely happen in very young childhood) doesn't bother
>trying on standardized tests, and doesn't try much later in life. So
>perhaps that's all that's being measured.
I didn't discuss this theory specifically because it seemed a poor one
to me. Instead, I discussed the more general theory that intelligence
tests may be testing something that is not closely related to our notion
of intelligence, and gave reasons for thinking the policy implications
are the same even if that is the case. If you raise a specific
possibility, and I discuss a broader possibility that includes your
specific possibility, it seems to me I have dealt with your point.
One good reason for rejecting the view that intelligence tests measure
only motivation at the time of taking the test is that it would be easy
to show that to be the explanation for racial differences in average
scores if that were the case. For example, a researcher could give the
test to two randomly chosen racially-mixed groups of kids and in one
case give the kids rewards that are larger for higher scores. Since the
view that there are racial differences in average intelligence is a view
that most people don't like and many find hateful, I think we can assume
that if evidence that seems to support it were easy to discredit
somebody would have done the job and we would have heard about it.
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From panix!not-for-mail Mon Dec 6 10:37:21 EST 1993
Article: 3728 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: PC as a condition of employment
Date: 6 Dec 1993 08:09:39 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 40
Message-ID: <2dvauj$644@panix.com>
References: <2dl5v8$2fs@zeus.london.micrognosis.com> <2dlfvb$3h1@panix.com> <2dv73g$f8i@zeus.london.micrognosis.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
ahumphr@micrognosis.co.uk (Aidan Humphreys) writes:
>|> >How would you respond to attempts to make PC attitudes and a condition
>|> >of employment.
>
>So doesn't this all add up to a politically motivated lobby using a
>combination of failed 'equal rights' legislation backed by the threat
>of civil litigation to force employers to indoctrinate thier staff in
>leftist political beliefs. Anyone feel nervous about that?
Sure. It's part of an overall trend toward tyranny.
The liberal view (in the current American meaning of "liberal") is that
if the government did other than they are doing in this area they would
be maintaining and supporting oppressive social structures simply by
establishing public order and enforcing property rights and so on. The
idea is that if the government could bring about ~X but doesn't, then
the government is choosing to bring about X because it is protecting the
social order of which X is part.
The only limitations on the unlimited power of the government (and duty
to use that power for liberal goals) are basic freedoms and the right to
privacy. It's not altogether clear what "basic freedoms" and "the right
to privacy" include. Plainly, they include the right to do things that
weaken oppressive social structures like organized religion, the family
and individual responsibility. They don't include the right to do
things that interfere with the realization of the ultimate goal of
liberalism, which is a state of affairs in which all the members of
society (except a small ruling class) are as equal and independent of
each other and as dependent on the state as possible. The evolving view
of abusive language and pornography is a case in point. As long as they
mostly subverted traditional morality they were protected by "basic
freedoms" and "the right to privacy"; now that they seem to be
interfering with the achievement of an egalitarian order serious
questions are being raised about them.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Dec 7 14:53:19 EST 1993
Article: 47443 of comp.sys.atari.st
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.atari.st
Subject: Atari repair in NYC
Date: 7 Dec 1993 14:51:58 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 12
Distribution: nyc
Message-ID: <2e2msu$nna@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
My 520ST is on the blink. It doesn't seem to want to tell the disk
drive to read anything, and when you boot you get a blank desktop.
Does anyone know of a place in New York City where I could get it
looked at? Village Computers used to service STs, but no more (they
got too upset with the company).
Thanks.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Dec 14 16:16:47 EST 1993
Article: 3765 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Patriotism, the last refuge of [?]
Date: 14 Dec 1993 16:12:09 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 68
Message-ID: <2ela79$1tu@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Many American conservatives emphasize patriotism, and it does seem that
a country cannot exist without some form of it. But what can
emphasizing patriotism mean in America today?
Patriotism has traditionally meant love for one's country -- one's land
and people -- and desire for its freedom and well-being. It has
traditionally been based on identification with a people living in a
particular place and constituting (at least by right) a separate
political society. Such a conception raises issues regarding American
patriotism today because the notion of an American people seems to have
been abandoned. If there were an American people it would have to be a
particular people with particular characteristics that distinguish it
from other peoples. However, large-scale immigration in recent decades,
and the replacement of the melting pot by multiracialism and
multiculturalism as governing ideals, seem to have eliminated the
possibility of drawing a distinction between the American people and the
population of the world at large on any grounds other than allegiance to
the government of the United States.
So it seems that American patriotism can now exist only if it is defined
as love of the American government rather than love of the land and
people of America. Such a love can be made comprehensible only if the
American government, which no longer stands for the interests of a
particular people, is thought to stand for abstract principles such as
liberty and equality viewed as universally applicable to all peoples.
American patriotism has always had a universalistic component, of
course. John Winthrop thought of the new Puritan commonwealth in
Massachusetts as "a city upon a hill" visible to all the world, and the
Gettysburg Address set forth what Lincoln considered to be the universal
significance of our Civil War. What seems to be new is the view that
universalism is the only legitimate component of American patriotism,
and that there is a patriotic duty to purify patriotism of such
particularisms as loyalty to a people that can be defined in any way
other than by reference to the American government.
Reducing patriotism to loyalty to the United States government
conceived as the bearer of a particular political ideology has certain
dangers. One difficulty is that there is no apparent reason why a
government conceived as the bearer of universal principles and not
essentially tied to a particular people would not feel obligated to put
its principles into effect universally. Kuwait and Somalia may be only
the beginning of foreign interventions in support of the New World
Order. In addition, it is hard to see how a government that is the
object of such loyalty could be made answerable to anyone. It can't
reasonably be made answerable to the people, because the government
creates the people rather than the people the government and because
the feature that makes the government an object of loyalty has nothing
to do with what desires the particular people who inhabit the 50 states
might happen to have. Conceivably, the government might be made
answerable to an ideological elite, but it seems that to do so would
simply be to make that elite part of the government (at least unless
the elite had other things to do that it considered more important than
politics).
Under the circumstances, it's not clear that it makes sense for
conservatives to keep on emphasizing American patriotism. To the extent
that American patriotism becomes equivalent to loyalty to political
structures devoted to anti-conservative ends that have nothing in
particular to do with our country it will become appropriate for those
who hold conservative values to find other objects for their main
political loyalties.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 16 10:11:13 EST 1993
Article: 11192 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Is there a COMMON goal for human life?
Date: 16 Dec 1993 10:10:57 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 46
Message-ID: <2eptq1$hds@panix.com>
References: <9754@blue.cis.pitt.edu> <1993Dec14.125809@ssht01.hou130.chevron.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
cvd@bear.com (Charles Dlhopolsky) writes:
>When people choose their goals they may choose them by thinking or
>they may choose them by playing tarot cards. They may make
>mistakes they may be lucky, but ultimately they do what they do
>because they think that it is what is best for them.
>
>THIS is the _common goal_ that all humans share. To live a life
>that they want to live.
Your last sentence might possibly mean any of several things:
1. To live a life they feel like choosing at the moment they make the
choice. This interpretation seems wrong, because if it were right they
could never make a choice that conflicted with the common goal that all
share. In your previous paragraph, though, you suggest that people can
choose goals wrongly.
2. To live a life that when lived will turn out to be something they
like. This seems better, but still doesn't seem right because if it
were then it would be impossible to judge incorrectly that the life one
leads is good. For example, if I owned thousands of slaves who I used
to serve my every whim, and I found that by some combination of early
training and neurosurgery I could ensure they liked their way of life
(thereby making them more useful for my purposes), then both I and my
slaves would be living a life we want to live, and on this
interpretation that would be OK.
3. To live a life that one would freely choose and be satisfied with if
he had all relevant knowledge and his faculty of choice had developed
normally. This interpretation sounds reasonable, but a lot is packed
into the word "normally". Maybe the Pope would tell you that if
people's faculty of choice had developed normally (that is, without the
influence of original sin) they would always choose the way of life that
leads as directly as possible to the beatific vision, and if you want to
find out what that way of life requires just go talk to your local
priest. On that view "the common goal that all humans share" would be
being a good Roman Catholic. Maybe someone else would tell you that a
faculty of choice develops normally only to the extent it is freed from
the ideological conditioning and biases inculcated by a patriarchal,
capitalist and racist society. There are lots of other possibilities.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 16 10:12:06 EST 1993
Article: 11193 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Purpose of life vs. Purpose in life
Date: 16 Dec 1993 10:11:58 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 26
Message-ID: <2eptru$hl3@panix.com>
References: <2enlpq$q15@amhux3.amherst.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
mbfeld@unix.amherst.edu (A waste of bandwidth) writes:
>There is no purpose of our lives. This follows from the axiom that the
>purpose of something must be outside that thing. What is the purpose
>of baseball? To provide enjoyment for its fans and players. Enjoyment
>must exist _apart_ from baseball. Because everything we know of is part
>of life, there is no purpose of our lives.
This seems solipsistic. Someone might say "All I know is what I am
experiencing right now. Therefore everything else (minds other than my
own, physical objects existing independently of my experience of them,
my own past experiences) is pure speculation and there's no reason for
me to believe in it even if I could understand what is meant by it."
I'm not sure that line of thought would be very different from yours.
Someone else might think that purposes we seemingly all have and can't
avoid having (to live well, for example) make sense only if there are
goods that are valuable regardless of whether or not anyone else
recognizes them as valuable. Such a person might reasonably view belief
in such goods as unavoidable and their realization as the objective
purpose of human life.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 16 15:15:30 EST 1993
Article: 11194 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Is there a COMMON goal for human life?
Date: 16 Dec 1993 10:13:21 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 36
Message-ID: <2eptuh$htg@panix.com>
References: <2efrtf$4km@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
nng@acsu.buffalo.edu (Neelamohan N) writes:
>I think there is no fundamental purpose in life. All purposes that we
>think are obvious are societal conditioning of some sort. Even the
>need to live is conditioning at some deeper level - by which I mean no
>one or nothing can do anything to you if you choose not to have that
>as your purpose to life (i.e., to live) - after all what can god do
>(even if he exists ) when you don't care whether you live or die.
>
>I essence all purposes are man made and IMHO are the sources of our
>unhappiness as we don't seem to realize this simple truth whenever we
>feel sad.
Do you think it is possible to have no purpose at all? That seems
impossible to me. We necessarily engage in voluntary actions, because
we could always do other than we in fact do. But to engage in voluntary
action is to make a choice and to make a choice is to have a purpose.
Even arbitrary choices (which shirt to wear when we don't much care) are
made for a purpose (getting dressed).
To have a purpose, though, is to view some state of affairs as better
than another, which means at least implicitly to have a view on what
things are good and bad and therefore to commit oneself to a substantive
ethical theory.
Another way of making what I think is the same point: it is impossible
seriously to deny that there is a fundamental purpose in life because
the alternative is to view our own fundamental choices as arbitrary.
People don't make fundamental choices arbitrarily, though, with no sense
whatever that what they are choosing appears to be somehow better than
what they are rejecting.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Dec 17 05:48:42 EST 1993
Article: 68925 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books
Subject: Ruskin and art criticism (was: where's the piece from?)
Date: 16 Dec 1993 18:25:15 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 16
Message-ID: <2eqqor$7vg@panix.com>
References: <2eovrt$g4p@morrow.stanford.edu> <93350.143808ADB4@psuvm.psu.edu> <93350.145659ADB4@psuvm.psu.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
writes:
>1) Ruskin's major works include _Modern Painters_, _The Stones of
> Venice_, and _Unto This Last_. Each of these runs to several
> volumes and is difficult to obtain (though Penguin has in
> print an abridged version of _Unto This Last_.)
When I read _Modern Painters_, especially the stuff on Turner, I thought
Ruskin was by far the best art critic I had ever read. On the other
hand, I've read very few art critics. Are there any Ruskin fans out
there, or fans of other art critics?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Dec 17 05:48:51 EST 1993
Article: 11199 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Purpose of life vs. Purpose in life
Date: 16 Dec 1993 16:32:22 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 47
Message-ID: <2eqk56$jfr@panix.com>
References: <2enlpq$q15@amhux3.amherst.edu> <2eptru$hl3@panix.com> <2eq62q$n6m@amhux3.amherst.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
mbfeld@unix.amherst.edu (A waste of bandwidth) writes:
>: >There is no purpose of our lives. This follows from the axiom that the
>: >purpose of something must be outside that thing. What is the purpose
>: >of baseball? To provide enjoyment for its fans and players. Enjoyment
>: >must exist _apart_ from baseball. Because everything we know of is part
>: >of life, there is no purpose of our lives.
>
>: This seems solipsistic [ . . . ]
>
>I don't think it makes me a solipsist to claim that everything we know about
>occurs within the context of life.
The Age of Dinosaurs didn't occur within the context of any human life.
My life doesn't occur within the context of your life because you could
drop dead and my life would go on much the same as ever. Nonetheless,
the Age of Dinosaurs occurred and I am real, and you can recognize that
both are real and know something about each.
>Noone who isn't alive wants to live well. How can living well
>(or something like it) be the purpose of life?
Two possibilities:
1. If every living thing that makes choices and is rational (in an
ethical context, capable of forming a conception of the good and acting
in accordance with that conception) necessarily wants to live well, then
it would make sense to call living well the purpose of rational life
because it is a purpose that every rational living being would accept.
The baseball analogy is not a good one. It is possible to take baseball
or leave it, so we can imagine a rational being demanding a reason for
playing it and refusing to do so when none is furnished. If for some
reason every rational being necessarily wanted to play baseball your
"purpose of/purpose in" distinction would be much less clear.
2. If the world as a whole has a purpose then the place of human life
in that overall purpose is presumably the purpose of human life, and
living in accordance with that overall purpose is presumably living
well. You seem to suggest that we can't know about some purposive
scheme of things that is not reducible to human life, but I'm not sure
why that would necessarily be more difficult than knowing about some
physical scheme of things that is not so reducible.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Dec 17 11:39:33 EST 1993
Article: 11203 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Purpose of life vs. Purpose in life
Date: 17 Dec 1993 06:40:16 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 30
Message-ID: <2es5r0$quu@panix.com>
References: <2eq62q$n6m@amhux3.amherst.edu> <2eqk56$jfr@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
nng@acsu.buffalo.edu (Neelamohan N) writes:
>after all what is being rational ? Trying to act
>consistent with some goal that "you have given yourself"
Maybe what's at issue in this discussion is what it is to be rational.
If "rational thought" means something like "thought that attempts to
arrive at truth in an orderly way in accordance with generally-
applicable principles", then it seems "rational action" ought to mean
something like "action that attempts to realize some good in an orderly
way in accordance with generally-applicable principles", where "truth"
and "good" are understood as valid for all thinkers and actors.
It seems that you would define "rational action" to be "action that
attempts to bring about some goal or other in an orderly way in
accordance with generally-applicable principles". Would you also define
"rational thought" to be "thought that attempts to promote some
conclusion or other in an orderly way in accordance with generally-
applicable principles"? If not, why not?
>Does the world as a whole have a purpose? I am not so sure.
Good question. I suppose in the end you'll think it does if you find
you can understand it better on that assumption, and otherwise you'll
think it doesn't.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Dec 18 11:56:13 EST 1993
Article: 11208 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Purpose of life vs. Purpose in life
Date: 18 Dec 1993 08:18:31 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 62
Message-ID: <2euvv7$7hb@panix.com>
References: <2es5r0$quu@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
nng@acsu.buffalo.edu (Neelamohan N) writes:
>To me the words good
>and bad (or what is desirable and undesirable) have no meaning outside
>a context or reference or to put it simply , they are conditioned on
>a goal. Otherwise I think the onus of defining what is a good deed and
>what is not is on the person who claims that such things exist outside
>a context (i.e., in and of themselves) [ . . . ]
>
>I think there is no such thing as absolute understanding.
To my mind the issue is whether it's possible to speak coherently about
human life and the world on the assumption that the only kind of
goodness is goodness for a purpose and the only kind of truth is truth
from a perspective. I don't think it is. It seems to me that we can't
seriously view our ultimate purposes as arbitrary (which is what they
would be if the only goodness were goodness for a purpose), if only
because seriously to view a purpose as arbitrary is to abandon it as a
purpose. It also seems to me that "truth from a perspective" is not
sufficient to distinguish truth from willful assertion, and we can't get
by without distinguishing the two. For starters, we can't make
assertions, willful or otherwise, without asserting that something is
true without regard to perspective.
>We see the world around us and observe patterns. What we see
>persistently is termed obvious. (e.g. things fall down). There is
>nothing obvious in an absolute sense. Tomorrow thngs could fall up for
>all you know and you can claim that it will not happen with a very
>high probability but not with certainity. After establishing
>something as obvious (- like things fall down), you'd try to see the
>same pattern in other situations. If you see the same pattern, you
>call it understanding. If you can't, youll try to relate it to some
>other pattern that you have observed. If you still can't, you'd call
>this a new fact and a new axiom that is further irreducible.
What is the status of these statements? Is it only true from a
perspective that we see the world around us and observe patterns
although nothing is absolutely obvious, or are these things that are
true categorically? If the former, why adopt the perspective from which
these things are true? Because we happen to feel like it? If so, what
meaning can be attributed to the word "rationality"? Also, given that
such a perspective has been adopted, is it categorically true that from
that perspective these things are true or is it only true from some
further perspective? (I realize you didn't use the word "perspective".
If my use of it distorts your meaning an explanation of the distortion
would be helpful.)
I think people's views on abstract questions like these are decided less
by particular arguments than by the experience of living with one view
or another. Writers that have helped me clarify what it would be like
to reject categorical truth and goodness include de Sade, Nietzsche and
Samuel Beckett. I'd recommend them to anyone who wanted to develop his
understanding of the issues.
>I may have repeated myself a number of times.
Nothing wrong with that.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Dec 18 15:21:57 EST 1993
Article: 1037 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Patriotism
Date: 18 Dec 1993 12:12:33 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 75
Message-ID: <2evdm1$rh9@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
I posted the following in alt.society.conservatism and got no comments.
I suppose it really relates to the incoherence of conservatism and the
necessity of counterrevolution under current conditions, so I think
I'll repost here even though it just rehashes material that is old in
this newsgroup:
Many American conservatives emphasize patriotism, and it does seem that
a country cannot exist without some form of it. But what can
emphasizing patriotism mean in America today?
Patriotism has traditionally meant love of country -- one's land and
people -- and desire for national freedom and well-being. It has
traditionally been based on identification with a people living in a
particular place and constituting (at least by right) a separate
political society. Such a conception raises problems regarding
American patriotism today because the notion of an American people
seems to have been abandoned. If there were an American people it
would have to be a particular people with particular characteristics
that distinguish it from other peoples. However, large-scale
immigration in recent decades, and the replacement of the melting pot
by multiracialism and multiculturalism as governing ideals, seem to
have eliminated the possibility of drawing a distinction between the
American people and the population of the world at large on any grounds
other than allegiance to the government of the United States.
It seems, then, that American patriotism can now exist only if it is
defined as love of the American government rather than love of the land
and people of America. Such a love can be made comprehensible only if
the American government, which no longer stands for the interests of a
particular people, is thought to stand for abstract principles such as
liberty and equality viewed as universally applicable to all peoples.
American patriotism has always had a universalistic component, of
course. John Winthrop thought of the new Puritan commonwealth in
Massachusetts as "a city upon a hill" visible to all the world, and the
Gettysburg Address set forth what Lincoln considered to be the universal
significance of our Civil War. What seems to be new is the view that
universalism is the only legitimate component of American patriotism,
and that there is a patriotic duty to purify patriotism of such
particularisms as loyalty to a people that can be defined in any way
other than by reference to the American government.
Reducing patriotism to loyalty to the United States government
conceived as the bearer of a particular political ideology has certain
dangers. One difficulty is that there is no apparent reason why a
government conceived as the bearer of universal principles and not
essentially tied to a particular people would not feel obligated to put
its principles into effect universally. Kuwait and Somalia may be only
the beginning of foreign interventions in support of the New World
Order. In addition, it is hard to see how a government that is the
object of such loyalty could be made answerable to anyone. It can't
reasonably be made answerable to the people, because the government
creates the people rather than the people the government and because
the feature that makes the government an object of loyalty has nothing
to do with what desires the particular people who inhabit the 50 states
might happen to have. Conceivably, the government might be made
answerable to an ideological elite, but it seems that to do so would
simply be to make that elite part of the government (at least unless
the elite had other things to do that it considered more important than
politics).
Under the circumstances, it's not clear that it makes sense for
conservatives to keep on emphasizing American patriotism. To the extent
that American patriotism becomes equivalent to loyalty to political
structures devoted to anti-conservative ends that have nothing in
particular to do with our country it will become appropriate for those
who hold conservative values to find other objects for their main
political loyalties.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Dec 20 04:30:32 EST 1993
Article: 1039 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Resource list
Date: 19 Dec 1993 17:42:33 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <2f2lcp$fmu@panix.com>
References: <2evdm1$rh9@panix.com> <93353.142353U24C1@wvnvm.wvnet.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Terry Rephann writes:
>I'd like to contribute a working bibliography of English language
>literature concerning new conservative political movements in the West,
>particularly the Leagues in Northern Italy and Austria's Freedom Party.
Sounds good. I've seen a couple of things in _Chronicles_ on the
subject but not much else. Any general comments on the character of
these movements? My impression is that one point that distinguishes
them from older right-wing movements is intellectual weakness. If
that's right maybe it just shows we don't live in one of the great ages
of political thought. Or maybe the impression is wrong. Any comments?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Dec 20 13:33:17 EST 1993
Article: 69117 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: What is a "fascist"?
Date: 20 Dec 1993 08:02:40 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 46
Message-ID: <2f47pg$442@panix.com>
References: <1993Dec18.081945.16410@midway.uchicago.edu> <2f2ndq$ir4@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix rec.arts.books:69117 talk.politics.theory:19197
gcf@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) writes:
>| See Plato's recognition of democracy sleazing into tyranny
>
>I don't know what Plato _recognized_, other than his own
>thoughts and desires, since I don't think he had any examples
>of democracy as we know it to work with. In more recent
>history, there have been very few examples of democracy
>_sleazing_ into tyranny, unless one regards democracy as
>tyranny _in_se_.
Plato's theory relates to fundamentals of political life and I don't
think it really depends on specific features of Greek democracy, like
the limitations on who had the right to participate or the assignment
of office by lot. It explains (if anything) the overall political
evolution of an entire society rather than day-to-day events. So the
way to determine whether his theory illuminates our situation is to
compare his schema (half-mythic utopia --> aristocracy --> oligarchy
--> democracy --> tyranny) to the history of the West since
Charlemagne. One could arrange that history in a manner similar to
Plato's schema (unrealized dream of a Christian empire --> aristocracy
--> bourgeois society --> democratic consumer society/welfare state -->
[?]). The question then becomes whether the same process of political
change (on the psychic level, the progressive loss of a principle of
order transcending immediate experience and the resulting liberation of
desire and impulse) has been at work in the West as in Plato's theory.
If so, then it begins to seem plausible that the story will play out as
Plato says, and the current situation, in which desire and impulse are
given as much free play as possible consistent with democratic
principles, will be replaced by the irrational rule of the strongest.
Aristotle objected to Plato's theory on the grounds that Greek society
had not in fact tended toward a tyrannical end state. A possible
rejoinder is that Plato was describing a psychic and political process
that could go to completion only within limits set by economics and
technology. To the extent most production took place within households
and most households would starve unless they disciplined themselves
brute necessity kept the psychic processes underlying the political
trend toward tyranny from going to completion. It is possible that
modern technology and economic organization have now set us free to
attain our true pragmatic destiny. No doubt time will tell.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Dec 21 12:39:12 EST 1993
Article: 1041 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Resource list
Date: 21 Dec 1993 09:16:42 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 46
Message-ID: <2f70ga$cn8@panix.com>
References: <93353.142353U24C1@wvnvm.wvnet.edu> <2f2lcp$fmu@panix.com> <1993Dec21.021255.25328@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>"Intellectual weakness"? That's a rather sweeping statement...which
>contemporary right-wing movements were you comparing,
I was mostly trying to provoke comment from people who know something.
All I know is what I dimly recollect from a couple of articles in
_Chronicles_. The movements I had in mind were the ones that were under
discussion, Haider's party in Austria and the League of the North (is
that what it's called?) in Italy. My impression was that these are
populist movements with leaders and supporters who aren't particularly
intellectual and of course have no ties to establishment intellectuals,
who don't like such movements and don't know what to make of them. I
don't know whether there are any non-establishment intellectuals who
support these movements or who if anyone the people in these movements
tend to look to to help clarify and develop their ideas.
>to which past
>right-wing movements? There's been quite a variety of movements, of
>varying intellectual quality. I'm of the opinion that explicitly political
>movements are necessarily weaker intellectually, though...
I thought the fascists and for that matter the National Socialists had
some intellectually quite distinguished supporters. Maybe not at first,
though. Also, the leaders at least read books and had ideas about
things that included serious cultural matters. There have also. of
course, been lots of intellectual right-wingers who never won any
elections.
There have been explicitly political movements with a strong
intellectual component. The movement for American independence and the
Bolsheviks are examples. More generally, a movement that is seriously
dissatisfied with the way things are is likely to do better if it
includes people who are able to think things through in a fundamental
and coherent way.
>Some more magazines:
The resource list continues to grow! When the New Year comes I'll put
out a last call for additions and then post a new version. (Anyone who
wants the current updated version before then can email me.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Dec 21 20:05:54 EST 1993
Article: 3835 of alt.society.conservatism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.society.conservatism
Subject: Re: Is Conservatism Confused with Parocialism?
Date: 21 Dec 1993 18:10:51 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 56
Message-ID: <2f7vpr$1ie@panix.com>
References: <2f60pj$cvk@inca.gate.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
ydessal1@cc.swarthmore.edu (Yonathan ) writes:
>Conservatism is all about tradition, values and integrity of the
>community -- and the preservation of these things [ . . . ] I think
>conservatism gets a lot of bad press because there is no ideology
>behind it. It's more of an attitude [ . . . ] I don't think there's a
>deterministic nature to conservatism. It's all about enriching
>yourself and your immediate community.
It seems to me what you're describing is a public-spirited attitude that
might exist in a settled community whose fundamental traditions are not
under radical attack. That's fine, and I'd like to live that way too,
but I'm not sure that attitude makes sense at a time like the present
when the radical individualist attack on all forms of traditional
community can't be shrugged off.
For starters, in the United States that attack is the moral foundation
of our educational and legal systems. Those systems treat individual
career success as the goal of life, individual taste and technical
efficiency as the standards of value, and equalizing the ability to do
whatever one pleases as the standard for social morality. All that may
be splendid from some perspectives, but it's not consistent with the
integrity of any community based on common traditions. So at present I
think the conservative goal should be to create a society in which an
attitude of the sort you describe makes sense. We're far from being
there now, though.
>[I]t's the perception of the hopelessness of conservatism that turns
>people off.
As you describe it, it does sound like a bit of a day dream.
>I would urge the conservative to acknowledge the impact of the post-
>industrial information age. Above all, what I would urge
>conservatives to do is to keep their values and actively engage in
>economic thinking.
It seems to me that our current way of life and publicly acceptable
modes of thought are hopelessly adverse to the things conservatives
value, and are becoming more so. So what I would urge conservatives to
do is develop their own ways of living that enable them to realize their
values and constantly question the way issues are discussed in this
country in the hope of increasing awareness of their perspective.
The conservative perspective, by the way, can't be self-sufficient in a
fundamentally anticonservative society like our own. So another thing
conservatives have to do, I think, is become more self-conscious about
what understanding of the world lies behind their conservatism and base
their political activities on that understanding rather than on
unreflective preferences for continuity. At present, continuity may
well be continuity with radical attacks on tradition.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Dec 22 11:18:25 EST 1993
Article: 69246 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: What is a "fascist"?
Date: 22 Dec 1993 07:51:01 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 24
Message-ID: <2f9frl$3np@panix.com>
References: <2f2ndq$ir4@panix.com> <2f5d1o$b32@tierra.santafe.ede> <2f8c1f$o2j@nic.umass.edu>
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Xref: panix rec.arts.books:69246 talk.politics.theory:19322
metafora@twain.ucs.umass.edu (Dick Metafora) writes:
>But I think Plato also saw another cycle where tyranny capitulates
>to the top of the order: Plato's timocrats, the noble, honor-
>motivated best of society who bring about a revolution against
>the tyranny of the mob.
This wasn't Plato's view. He seemed to think that by the time democracy
is ready to slide into tyranny there wouldn't be enough lovers of honor
around to matter politically. Instead, there would be people with the
orderly and industrious habits characteristic of the preceding form of
society (oligarchy) who devote themselves to making money and prosper.
These people would put up a fight when the democracy decides to
expropriate and redistribute their money. Once the fight begins the
people feel threatened and find a leader, and give him unconstitutional
powers to fight the oligarchs. That leader then becomes a tyrant when
he notices his power can be used for personal purposes and (since
democracy inculcates no sufficient principle of restraint) sees no
reason why he should not do so.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Dec 22 16:35:48 EST 1993
Article: 1044 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Northern League (Re: Resource List)
Date: 22 Dec 1993 12:23:37 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 57
Message-ID: <2f9vqp$ns1@panix.com>
References: <93353.142353U24C1@wvnvm.wvnet.edu> <2f2lcp$fmu@panix.com> <93356.093108U24C1@wvnvm.wvnet.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Terry Rephann writes:
>>>I'd like to contribute a working bibliography of English
>>>language literature concerning new conservative political
>>>movements in the West, particularly the Leagues in Northern
>>>Italy and Austria's Freedom Party.
>
>>Any general comments on the character
>>of these movements? My impression is that one point that
>>distinguishes them from older right-wing movements is
>>intellectual weakness. If that's right maybe it just shows we
>>don't live in one of the great ages of political thought. Or
>>maybe the impression is wrong. Any comments?
>
>I don't know how you would come to that conclusion based on
>articles in _Chronicles_ .
Could just be bad memory, combined with lack of particular interest at
the time I read the articles. (The stuff in the resource list about
the ENR is all from Mr. Deane.) I looked for the relevant articles on
the Italian movement in my stack of back issues of _Chronicles_ and
couldn't find them to see what it was that I thought I remembered. I
did find something on the Freedom Party which seemed consistent with
the view that it's a populist movement that hasn't done much
theorizing. Would you say there's more to it than that?
>[The Lombard Leagues] adapted their program to fit into a post-fordist
>economic reality. They are federalists in an age in which
>federalism making increasing political and economic sense. They
>are communitariation without being hateful. They are literate.
>These qualities are almost non-existant in modern conservative
>political movements. I think that there is much the Americans can
>learn from them.
I will try to find Fleming's articles so I can take a closer look at
them.
>I disagree about your characterization of the National
>Socialist movement as having a core of sound intellectuals.
I don't think I said that, only that at some point they picked up some
distinguished support and that they had leaders who read books and had
views on serious cultural matters.
>Much has been written about the Leagues in the American
>press. They've been characterized in _Time_ and _Newsweek_ as far
>right and xenophobic. American academics are slowly coming to the
>realization that these characterizations are sensationalistic,
>simplistic, and unfair (see, for example, the recent issue (3:2)
>of _Regional Politics and Policy_).
I look forward to seeing your bibliography.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 23 05:53:25 EST 1993
Article: 69286 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: What is a "fascist"?
Date: 22 Dec 1993 17:24:26 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 46
Message-ID: <2faheq$85p@panix.com>
References: <2f8c1f$o2j@nic.umass.edu> <2f9frl$3np@panix.com> <2f9tki$42i@nic.umass.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix rec.arts.books:69286 talk.politics.theory:19352
metafora@twain.ucs.umass.edu (Dick Metafora) writes:
>JK: He seemed to think that by the time democracy
>: is ready to slide into tyranny there wouldn't be enough lovers of honor
>: around to matter politically.
>
>Where's he say this?
At 564-565 he says that the democratic state has a tripartite structure,
the rich, the common people, and what he calls the "drones" (the idle
and spendthrift), and he explains the degeneration into tyranny by
reference to those classes. He doesn't represent any of them as
concerned with honor.
>The _Republic_ at least, goes on to discuss the
>well-balanced personality, with the best part, the philosophical part,
>in control.(590d:) "Shouldn't such kinds of men be governed in the way
>that the best man governs himself? This is what we mean when we say
>that they should be slaves to the best man who has the divine principle
>within him...It will be best if all are governed by what is intelligent
>and divine"
By that time he's gone from describing the types of constitution and
corresponding types of character, and how they arise, to evaluating them
without reference to historical sequence.
>And then, in the _Laws_ he gets into his favorite exercise
>of utopia-planning, presumably a post-tyranny scenario in that Athens
>had its experience with democracy degenerating into tyranny.
Plato presented his utopias as possible, but was doubtful they would
ever be realized. The system developed in the _Laws_ is presented as
one that could be applied to a new colony. (See 703).
>Plato does not specifically
>say the tyrant is overthrown by the Aristocracy, I just drew that
>conclusion.
I can't cite you to anything, but I don't think Plato ever gives a
cyclic view of history in which one cycle ends and another begins
without a major catastrophe.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 23 10:16:01 EST 1993
Article: 1046 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Northern League (Re: Resource List)
Date: 23 Dec 1993 07:16:10 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 37
Message-ID: <2fc26a$buc@panix.com>
References: <93356.093108U24C1@wvnvm.wvnet.edu> <2f9vqp$ns1@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
godfrey@indirect.com (Godfrey Daniels) writes:
>such men as Oswald Spengler were involved with Nazism as far back as
>he early 20s [ . . . ] don't forget Heidegger's
>joining the Nazi Party.
Spengler? I wouldn't have thought so, if only because pessimistic
historical determinists with unusual theories to which they are very
attached don't seem like good material for a revolutionary mass
movement. I'm ignorant on the subject, though. Does anyone have some
good references? I'm actually more interested in Heidegger's case.
People are always abusing him for his connection to the Nazis, but I
haven't seen a sober account of just what that connection was.
>It is a mistake to think of National Socialism as a simple-minded
>doctrine, easy to "see through." You don't see the Ku Klux Klan taking
>over a modern industrialized nation, do you?
Hitler certainly wasn't stupid. _Mein Kampf_ has some very penetrating
comments on the political uses of violence, hatred and mindless
ideological slogans. Just the thing if you want to establish a 12-
jaehrige Reich ending in disaster. Also, it seems to me that something
like Nazism is a reasonable outcome of radical cultural relativism, a
point of view with which many intelligent people have a great deal of
sympathy because they reject the notion of transcendent truth.
>WHENALLGOVERNMENTSHALLBEDRAWNTOWASHINGTONAS
>THECENTEROFALLPOWER#IT
>WILLBECOMEASOPPRESSIVEASTHEGO
>VERNMENTFROMWHICHWESEPARATED#TJFFRSN
More oppressive, I should think.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Dec 23 10:16:04 EST 1993
Article: 69304 of rec.arts.books
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: rec.arts.books,talk.politics.theory
Subject: Re: What is a "fascist"?
Date: 23 Dec 1993 07:17:35 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 31
Message-ID: <2fc28v$c28@panix.com>
References: <2f9tki$42i@nic.umass.edu> <2faheq$85p@panix.com> <2favng$lnj@nic.umass.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix rec.arts.books:69304 talk.politics.theory:19367
metafora@twain.ucs.umass.edu (Dick Metafora) writes:
>My original point was that fascism, and a lot of other political
>ideology, fortunate or otherwise, can draw on these noble Platonic
>notions of a disciplined elite and an icky licentious democracy.
>Which, I reiterate, is why Plato deserves lots of qualifications as a
>guide to modern politics.
I think of him as a diagnostician rather than a guide to practical
politics. He didn't think his specific proposals could ever be realized
except through some extraordinary stroke of luck. The most immediately
practical point he makes is that political systems destroy themselves
through excess. You are right, of course, that all sorts of people can
make all sorts of uses of one aspect or another of his thought.
>The remaining fragment of what I was aiming at was fascism at its
>creation was hardly as obvious in its ultimate form as it is in
>hindsight. And anything _now_ dubbed "fascist" is subject to a great
>deal of unhelpful mischaracterization [ . . . ]
I'm inclined to agree. Generals are always fighting the last war, and
something similar seems to be true in politics.
We've been talking somewhat at cross-purposes in this exchange, by the
way, since you have mostly been concerned with fascism and I've been
mostly concerned with Plato.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Jan 1 16:24:23 EST 1994
Article: 1053 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: This so-called "Great Nation"
Date: 1 Jan 1994 11:59:53 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 41
Distribution: na
Message-ID: <2g4a69$5a3@panix.com>
References:
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
guido@ephsa.sat.tx.us (Herb Zimmerman) writes:
>We as Americans have a major problem on our hands. It is what the
>government is now reconizing as "Urban Decay." And whaat is the
>government going to do about this? Probably nothing. I think it is
>time that we Americans do something about our government. It is time
>that we took this country back, the hard working middle class of
>course.
You might take a look at _Chronicles_. It's a monthly magazine that has
a couple of regular writers who are developing this general line of
thought. It's more intellectual than activist; maybe others have more
practically-oriented recommendations.
I would say it's overall social and cultural decay rather than urban
decay as such. What's happening is that the traditional social patterns
that in the past provided a basis for the development of human character
and personality are being displaced and destroyed by formal bureaucratic
and market arrangements. People tend to favor the latter because they
interfere less with the immediate gratification of impulse. Since the
development of character and personality that constitutes culture
requires the organization of impulse by reference to some ideal, and
therefore interferes with immediate gratification, the change has led to
cultural decline with little prospect of anything but further decline
until the trend reverses.
>If the American population wants something done, they are going to have
>to do it themselves. If the citizens started to crack down on crime
>and drugs, the crime and drug rate would probably go down. But anyway,
>it is time that we Americans took back this once promising nation. Now
>is the time. Lets take the stand NOW! Let the war begin!
What's the proposal? Community patrols? Citizen's arrests? Vote in
new politicians? Vigilante action? Each person do something of his
choice?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 2 22:26:28 EST 1994
Article: 5654 of sci.anthropology
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.anthropology,sci.sociology
Subject: Cultures that resist assimilation
Date: 1 Jan 1994 21:29:56 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 11
Message-ID: <2g5bj4$obq@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
For a non-technical article I am writing I need information and
analysis regarding cultures (such as the Amish, the Gypsies and certain
Orthodox Jewish groups) that are unusually successful in resisting
assimilation to the usual patterns of American life for the sake of
maintaining their own traditional way of life. Any suggestions for
someone who is a layman in the social sciences?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Jan 3 16:31:19 EST 1994
Article: 1059 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: This so-called "Great Nation"
Date: 3 Jan 1994 12:16:11 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 51
Message-ID: <2g9jsr$acj@panix.com>
References: <17633.nguy0094@gold.tc.umn.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
"Christian Nguyen" writes:
>Just curious, but where do you think this country is going and do you
>have ideas?
I think that on the whole we are becoming less civilized -- stupider,
more violent, more self-seeking, less able to cooperate, less able to
imagine anything better than our actual way of life. This trend will
lead to yet greater disorder and violence and most likely with time to
civil chaos and political tyranny. If people no longer have the
qualities needed for voluntary cooperation then after a period of
disorder someone will force them to cooperate.
I may be wrong, of course. Other possibilities include:
1. A religious revival or new religion that restores a principle of
order to people's lives. It's worth noting, though, that revived and
new religions neither saved Rome nor (apparently) interfered with
adverse trends such as the decline in public spirit and the increase in
taxation and rigid central control.
2. Continued development of methods of communicating and handling
information that make centralized control less practical. As a result,
people would have to rely more on themselves and their families and
friends and less on the government. Such a trend would lead to more
emphasis on self-discipline and responsibility to others. Right-wingers
with modernist and free-market sympathies emphasize this possibility.
One point worth noting is that while a pure free market is not as
culturally and socially destructive as a free market combined with a
welfare state it can nonetheless be destructive. Maybe it's our only
hope, though.
3. Many people seem to expect that some new method of education will be
developed that will put people so much in charge of their own lives and
so respectful of the rights of others that they will no longer need the
guidance and support of social moral standards to lead happy and
productive lives. Such an expectation seems wholly unfounded to me.
4. Many people argue that nothing dramatically bad will happen as a
result of the tendencies that bother right-wingers because to the extent
those tendencies really exist they are simply part of social evolution,
and in history institutional change is the only constant. One runs into
this argument particularly often in connection with the state of the
family. One problem with it is that decline and catastrophe is also
part of history, and so is worrying about trends and trying to do
something about them.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Jan 3 16:31:21 EST 1994
Article: 1060 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Strategy and tactics ...
Date: 3 Jan 1994 12:18:36 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 51
Message-ID: <2g9k1c$at1@panix.com>
References: <1994Jan2.183645.26203@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
wbralick@nyx10.cs.du.edu (Will Bralick) writes:
>Mr. Limbaugh suggests:
>
> ``Live your life the way you think that it should be
> lived. Influence the people around you. But don't
> do it with rancor, bitterness, or hatred. Be of good
> cheer. Be a living example of that which you advocate.
> No matter where you are or in what walk of life, that
> lesson applies. If you follow that principle, you will
> be a beacon of truth and righteousness among those with
> whom you associate.''
[To which Mr. Bralick adds that as a matter of formal politics:]
>The first priority then should be a major tax and spending cut at all
>levels of government.
President Reagan observed that although tax cuts are politically popular
Congress institutionally can't help but spend all the money it has and
then some, so he made his first priority a major tax cut. An astute
move.
I suppose the theory is that good drives out bad unless bad uses unfair
means. Mr. Limbaugh's point is that if you don't like how people are
living you should start by demonstrating what a good life is like. Mr.
Bralick adds that forcible confiscation of wealth can be a way of
giving the worse side an unfair advantage in the competition of ideas
and ways of life, especially since bad people are likely to be more
skillful at using force and manipulating complicated systems to their
own advantage than good people. Both very sensible points. I would
add to what Mr. Limbaugh says that if you don't like how people think
about things you should develop what you think and engage others'
beliefs fairly, and to what Mr. Bralick says that government regulation
(such as civil rights laws and other protective legislation) can also
help prevent fair competition among ways of life and so should be an
early target of the counterrevolution. A great deal of theorizing,
arguing and persuading will be necessary before there is any reasonable
possibility of repealing current protective legislation, of course.
(Students of political thought will notice that the proposed theory is a
liberal theory. The theory behind the theory is that liberalism is not
stable but tends to turn into something else. As Plato notes in his
_Republic_, the normal tendency is for liberalism to degenerate into
tyranny. My goal is to find conditions under which it will evolve into
something better than itself.)
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Mon Jan 3 16:31:35 EST 1994
Article: 11297 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 3 Jan 1994 12:22:58 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 69
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A few random comments, not necessarily on the most important aspects of
your article:
EGNILGES@delphi.com writes:
>In the last chapter of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty states
>without argument that "we", one's group, broadly or narrowly conceived,
>can continue to provide a basis for morality; but despite his own pious
>hope that the "we" will expand rather than contract, that pious hope
>itself is by Rorty's own account completely discredited.
It seems that Nazism is quite a reasonable conclusion if one starts by
making his own group the sole basis of morality. If "what is good" is
nothing more than "what we like", relative success is nonetheless a
criterion by which "what we like" can be shown to be superior to "what
you like" because if we are successful and you aren't then "what we like"
will exist and "what you like" won't exist, and desired things that
exist (which is what we like) are clearly better than desired things
that don't exist (which is what you like). It follows that any group
will be able to make its version of the good objectively superior to
every other version simply by being relatively more successful than
every other group. Since destruction is easier than creation, the
obvious way for one group to become relatively more successful than all
others is to develop its capacity to enslave and destroy other groups as
much as possible, and then to do so.
>it is still impossible to describe a collection as "literature" and at
>the same time engage in secular theodicy to any great degree.
Is it your view that literature, unless it is art for art's sake, must
always oppose the existing order? Or is that only true if the existing
order is understood as secular rather than divinely ordained? When do
you think it is appropriate for literature to praise something that
actually exists?
(An aside: the best description of the joy of work I can recall is the
bricklaying scene in _A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch_.)
>Without a committment to Truth as such, language becomes a useless
>pursuit, and the widespread reduction of the Bill of Rights to the
>Second Amendment
Not so widespread. I once heard a well-known constitutional scholar
(Bruce Ackerman) tell a story about seeing a sign saying "Support the
Second Amendment" and being unable to remember what it was.
>Rorty writes in a society in which advertising messages and computer
>output have become the modal case of "language." [ . . . ] I hope to
>show that this is why Rorty must deny metaphysics.
The two do seem connected. It appears that moral objectivity requires
metaphysics, and in the absence of the two all we're left with is
language as a vehicle either of data to be processed within an arbitrary
formal system or of emotive impulses intended to induce action by the
hearer that promotes some purpose of the speaker, in the limiting case
the mere increase in his power.
>Cora Diamond recently gave a talk at Princeton University in which she
>showed, or tried to show, the relationship between philosophical
>disturbance and bad character.
Has it been printed anywhere? Sounds interesting, or at least
revealing.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Jan 4 09:09:19 EST 1994
Article: 1063 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Strategy and tactics ...
Date: 4 Jan 1994 06:17:22 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 38
Message-ID: <2gbj82$qfc@panix.com>
References: <1994Jan2.183645.26203@mnemosyne.cs.du.edu> <2g9k1c$at1@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
aaiken@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Andrew C. Aiken) writes:
>[Reagan] could have stated the counter-revolutionary position with
>clarity, and in so doing, routed the left permanently.
The cultural and institutional position of the left seems much stronger
than that to me. The clearest statement will be ignored, misconstrued
and misquoted if it conflicts with the dominant viewpoint. Part of the
reason is that, as you say,
> The left has seized our language.
[Moving on to other points:]
> The problem with Mr. Limbaugh, despite the fact that I find him
>entertaining now and then (although I don't listen much), is that he
>uses the debate tactics of the left to advance ostensibly conservative
>positions. He attempts to make conservatism "fun," as if this isn't
>the problem itself: we must have "fun," and constantly be presented
>with novelties that shock and amuse us.
One man can't cure all vices. It seems to me that RL is making it
easier for people to conceive of right-wing alternatives to
establishment liberalism and to the centralized administration of news
and public opinion that has grown up in this country. Maybe he presents
his alternative in a trivialized form, but you have to start somewhere.
> Strict controls on the scope of democracy might help.
Agreed. The controls can't be imposed by merely formal means, though.
They have to be consistent with the spirit of the people and their
understanding of politics. Otherwise the forms will be used for quite
different purposes.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Tue Jan 4 12:10:07 EST 1994
Article: 1064 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Resource list
Date: 4 Jan 1994 12:09:36 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 10
Message-ID: <2gc7sg$9cc@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
As promised, I will be distributing a revised a.r.c. resource list
shortly. Please send me any proposed additions. If you don't have a
copy of the last version or can't remember what you've already sent me,
please email me and I will send you a copy of the current working
version including everything I've been sent up to now.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Wed Jan 5 06:51:57 EST 1994
Article: 30753 of alt.feminism
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.skeptic,alt.feminism,talk.origins,sci.psychology
Subject: Re: Gould's _Mismeasure_ a "Masterpiece of Propaganda": Nature
Date: 4 Jan 1994 18:50:59 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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Xref: panix sci.skeptic:54656 alt.feminism:30753 talk.origins:53982 sci.psychology:13788
>African-Americans have only been separated from Africans for about 350
>years. My point is that 350 years is not enough time to account for a
>15 point IQ difference IF you assume that inheritence is 70-75% for
>IQ, as Jensen does. This means that if Jensen is right, then Africans
>have a lower IQ, in general, than Europeans. There is no reason to
>make this assumption and there is no way to test it since I doubt that
>you could design an IQ test for Tswana, Kikhulu, Masai, Ibo, Neur and
>all of the other groups of African peoples, each one of whom has its
>own language and culture.
What's the argument? Does it differ from the following:
"If intelligence is 70-75% hereditable then the great-grandchildren of
this year's Nobel Prize winners will on average be significantly more
intelligent than a random selection of their contemporaries. There is
no reason to make this assumption apart from the hypothesis
intelligence is hereditable, and no way to test it since you can't test
the intelligence of people who don't even exist yet. Therefore the
hypothesis should be rejected since its truth depends on the truth of a
statement than can be neither assumed nor tested."
>If general intellegence is a strongly inheritated trait with a strong
>biological basis than selection for general intelligence in Africa should
>have been as strong as general intelligence in Europe, Asia or other parts
>of the world.
Why couldn't intelligence have varying importance in different
environments?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Jan 6 19:50:32 EST 1994
Article: 1069 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Strategy and tactics ...
Date: 6 Jan 1994 14:43:50 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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References: <2gbj82$qfc@panix.com>
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aaiken@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Andrew C. Aiken) writes:
>[Rush Limbaugh] displays a weakness that many conservatives have,
>namely a reluctance to criticize the crassness of our culture, because
>it is the natural result of capitalism. Many conservatives defend
>excessive materialism as being within the rights of the individual.
>This principle is worth defending from a legal standpoint if only to
>protect property rights, but why should we be afraid of ceding ground
>to the left if we criticize the poor taste and spiritual poverty of the
>nouveau riche?
It's a problem. If you say that people who rise in the world by making
lots of money characteristically have the serious flaws you mention,
then you're saying that in important ways those who most noticeably
benefit from the capitalist system are unworthy of the wealth and power
they obtain. By saying that you are lending support to bureaucratic
egalitarianism, which is what people understand the alternative to
capitalism to be.
The problem would go away if either people were reliably convinced that
bureaucratic egalitarianism is necessarily worse than capitalism, which
they aren't, or if right-wingers had a plausible third form of society
to offer, which they don't. Or at least the right-wingers in this
newsgroup don't at present. No doubt things would change if the
integrists and distributivists resurfaced, or if Mr. Deane learned
enough foreign languages to tell us about the positive programs the ENR
has given rise to.
>> Strict controls on the scope of democracy might help.
>the people has unfortunately abandoned the republican spirit. We can
>no longer expect that the people will see the law as something mighty,
>and not to be altered merely to suit popular whims. The encroachment
>of excessive democracy into our politics began long ago, but it has
>proceeded apace. The courts are the only remaining check on our
>democratic institutions, but as verdicts in such cases as the Yankel
>Rosenbaum murder show, there is no guarantee that the mob will not rule
>there as well.
If the people don't have the republican spirit, how can the courts be
expected to interpret controls on the scope of democracy consistently
with the republican spirit? Why wouldn't they either go with the
democratic flow or interpret the controls in a way that increases the
power of the class to which the judges belong? The courts might do the
latter, for example, by interpreting the law in a sense that reduces the
authority and interferes with the functioning of agencies of social
control other than the federal government, and that grants individuals
welfare rights against government.
> Conservatives must found their own counterculture which opposes
>the revolutionary culture of the mainstream.
A counterculture is no doubt necessary, but founding one is easier said
than done. Mr. Limbaugh's proposal (that you quoted) was that we each
live as well as we can and hope it spreads. In addition, discussion can
clarify the problems with the present situation and what other
possibilities there are. I suppose that's what this newsgroup is for.
You seem to want something beyond talk and the cultivation of private
rectitude, though.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Thu Jan 6 19:50:40 EST 1994
Article: 11332 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 6 Jan 1994 14:45:47 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
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References: <940102.81949.EGNILGES@delphi.com> <2g9k9i$bk5@panix.com> <940106.37557.EGNILGES@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
EGNILGES@delphi.com writes:
>>(An aside: the best description of the joy of work I can recall is the
>>bricklaying scene in _A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch_.)
>
>there's a very similar passage in Bruno Bettelheim's writings,
>concerning his experience in a Nazi concentration camp. Like a
>character in Solzenitsyn, Bettelheim claimed that when he was forced by
>his captors to run in the cold and rain, he had a sense of freedom
>after he found that his captors could do no more.
I don't think this affects your main points, but the value of the
bricklaying wasn't a consequence of its being something the zeks were
forced to do. Part of Ivan's day was something that in itself is a good
(absorption in skilled, cooperative and productive work).
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Jan 7 07:20:54 EST 1994
Article: 1072 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Strategy and tactics ...
Date: 6 Jan 1994 21:21:58 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 48
Message-ID: <2gih06$hu6@panix.com>
References: <2ghplm$cqa@panix.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
aaiken@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Andrew C. Aiken) writes:
> I have not read much of their stuff, but the communitarians have
> said some interesting things.
I haven't read them. Based on nothing but their apparent respectability
I am inclined to doubt that anything they say could be very useful. As
long as the discussion remains brainless, "community" sounds warm and
fuzzy. A community can't exist, though, without illiberal and forbidden
things like presumed common purposes, prejudices regarding insiders and
outsiders, evaluative distinctions among members, and so on. I could be
wrong about the communitarians, though. Comments?
The fact that American typically
do not view themselves as citizens anymore appears to be a nearly
intractable problem.
People have responded to similar situations in the past by viewing
themselves as citizens of the republic of the virtuous, or the cosmos,
or the City of God. Sometimes they tried to give their citizenship
flesh and blood by setting up academies, monasteries or whatever.
> I am something of a
> libertarian conservative, but it seems at time that Americans are
> indifferent to the changes being effected in their culture, for better
> or worse; but although this is occasionally frustrating, it is
> certainly within an individual's rights to be indifferent.
The indifference is odd, isn't it? I'm inclined to think it's a result
of the centralization of the agencies through which public opinion is
formed and expressed. Tom Fleming is fond of observing that people talk
about stuff on talk radio that you don't read much about in _Newsweek_.
> I hope only for the cultivation of private rectitude, as you put it,
> but does this not become more difficult in an environment which
> is hostile to the idea of "rectitude"?
You have to become a crank and find like-minded cranks to develop your
crank theories and crank way of life. You won't get anywhere by saying
"first and foremost I'm an American" and asking yourself "how should we
Americans live?"
[Possibly I'm being too ill-tempered. If so, it may pass.]
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Fri Jan 7 22:55:53 EST 1994
Article: 11345 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 7 Jan 1994 10:29:41 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 106
Message-ID: <2gjv55$53c@panix.com>
References: <940102.81949.EGNILGES@delphi.com> <2g9k9i$bk5@panix.com> <1994Jan7.021745.11845@cnsvax.uwec.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
nyeda@cnsvax.uwec.edu (David Nye) writes:
>>It seems that Nazism is quite a reasonable conclusion if one starts by
>>making his own group the sole basis of morality. If "what is good" is
>>nothing more than "what we like", relative success is nonetheless a
>>criterion by which "what we like" can be shown to be superior to "what
>>you like"
>
>This is a common criticism of moral relativism, but I see two problems
>with it.
>
>1) Simply wanting something to be true or false is not a rational basis
>for considering it so. An undesirable social outcome (the validity or
>invalidity of Nazism) should therefore be given no weight when trying to
>decide whether or not an absolute moral standard exists.
It seems reasonable to me to make the consequences of holding an outlook
part of the overall discussion regarding whether that outlook should be
adopted. One common argument for adopting a view of the world
consistent with and supportive of modern natural science is that modern
natural science actually works, and that argument doesn't seem
unreasonable to me. Also, I should mention that the comment you quote
above was prompted by a reference in the original article to the view
that the rejection of moral relativism has bad consequences.
By the way, I don't think I said anything about moral relativism or
absolutism in general. I was trying to deal with more specific lines of
thought.
>2) The argument subtly begs the question. When you speak of criteria
>by which "'what we like' can be shown to be superior to 'what you like',
>you already assume that there is an absolute sense in which one can be
>found to be superior.
I think the argument runs as follows:
1. People sometimes find they are uncertain as to their overall
ethical views.
2. When they are uncertain about ethics then, if they are rational
and reflective, they ask themselves what ethical principles they
can't help but accept, or at least feel most strongly inclined to
accept and can't see any sufficient reason to reject, and resolve
their ethical uncertainties using those principles as parsimoniously
as possible.
3. Professor Rorty, at least on Mr. Nilges' reading (I can't speak
of his views from my own knowledge), proposes solidarity with one's
group as an ethical principle that people in fact are strongly
inclined to accept. It appears that consistent with his overall
philosophical stance he accepts no ethical principle that transcends
and limits group solidarity. Conceivably, his acceptance of group
solidarity as a reliable moral principle might simply be based on
the view that man is biologically a social animal.
4. Group solidarity only tells us that whatever we want for our
group we should support, but it doesn't tell us much about what we
should want for our group. Therefore, to the extent we are
uncertain what to want for our group we need further ethical
principles.
5. In accordance with the principle of parsimony, we should first
derive our view of our group's good as much as possible from
solidarity, the ethical principle already accepted. As a factual
matter, the solidarity of a human group is increased by unity within
(_ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer_) and conflict without.
6. The external conflict must have a goal, though. It seems
doubtful that a war undertaken for the sole and explicitly-avowed
purpose of increasing the solidarity of a group would achieve its
intended effect. Nor are material advantages a sufficient or even
worthy goal for war from this perspective, since sacrifice increases
solidarity while peace and cooperation among groups lead to
prosperity and the dissolution of solidarity.
7. Therefore, what is needed is a reason for war that is purely
formal, so as to preserve parsimony and achieve universal
applicability, and that people can't help but find compelling.
Comparative success -- the achievement by my group of its goals
combined with the failure of your group to achieve its goals --
seems to be such a reason. Comparative success means that my group
wants something that exists while your group wants something that
doesn't exist, and I think people do tend strongly to view such a
situation as a demonstration of the superiority of the principles
that define and unify my group (that is, of the ethical principles
accepted by my group).
8. Comparative success would be most strikingly and undeniably
achieved through the successful prosecution of a universal war of
conquest followed by the enslavement, torture and on occasion
annihilation of groups other than one's own. Therefore, an ethic
based on social solidarity would be most perfectly carried out by
preparing for and undertaking such a war and by striving for
perfect unity within the group and self-sacrificing devotion to
its goals.
I should add that the point of the argument is not that Nazism is good,
nor that it is a necessary immediate result of moral relativism, but
only that it is a reasonable conclusion from the principle of making
solidarity with one's group the basic principle of morality, at least if
reasonableness includes a principle of parsimony.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Jan 8 05:41:02 EST 1994
Article: 11353 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 7 Jan 1994 23:09:42 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 14
Message-ID: <2glbm6$2p8@panix.com>
References: <2g9k9i$bk5@panix.com> <940106.37557.EGNILGES@delphi.com> <2gl2dk$9de@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
gbyshenk@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (gregory m. byshenk) writes:
>And I believe his further claim is that opposition to cruelty is
>part of liberals' "final vocabulary"; i.e. that for which there can be
>no further reasons given.
To say no further reasons can be given is to say that opposition to
cruelty does not follow from anything in his general outlook. He needs
a special _ad hoc_ principle to say that cruelty is bad.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sat Jan 8 20:51:52 EST 1994
Article: 11362 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: sci.skeptic,soc.culture.scientists,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.anthropology
Subject: Re: Skeptical about magic and wicca
Date: 8 Jan 1994 20:50:41 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 13
Message-ID: <2gnnth$om1@panix.com>
References: <2gmjpa$jkj@asylum.sf.ca.us> <2gnm69$mbf@samba.oit.unc.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
Xref: panix sci.skeptic:55141 soc.culture.scientists:3976 talk.philosophy.misc:11362 sci.anthropology:5850
In <2gnm69$mbf@samba.oit.unc.edu> Jonathan.Woodall@launchpad.unc.edu (jonathan edward woodall) writes:
> Although I can't think of a large number of matriarchal societies
>off the top of my head, if you want a documented account of one, check out
>the Tchambuli. They are chapters 14 through 16 of the book
>_Sex_and_Temperament_ by Margaret Mead (Morrow Book Co, 1936.)
Have other investigators confirmed Mead's account?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 07:12:54 EST 1994
Article: 1078 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Counter-revolutionary art
Date: 8 Jan 1994 21:20:25 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <2gnpl9$s31@panix.com>
References:
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
In aaiken@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (Andrew C. Aiken) writes:
>FILM
>the works of Frederico Fellini
Your examples suggest that the CR implications can remain in the
background. The best conservative filmmaker I can think of is Ozu.
His complaint about the modern world, though, is that people are
selfseeking and unfeeling, and don't regard personal relationships.
Not the sort of guy who would storm Parliament on behalf of the
counterrevolution.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 11:20:07 EST 1994
Article: 1079 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: reading
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:18:45 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 104
Message-ID: <2gpap5$9kt@panix.com>
References: <1994Jan9.010627.15107@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Gene Edward Veith, Jr., "Modern Fascism. Liquidating the Judeo-
>Christian Worldview" (1993). A provocative book by a Lutheran, and
>vaguely neo-conservative, writer. He is on strong ground when he shows
>the similarities between fascist, modernist, and postmodernist
>philosophies,
Here's something I posted a couple of days ago in talk.philosophy.misc
as part of a discussion of various pomos:
>>It seems that Nazism is quite a reasonable conclusion if one starts by
>>making his own group the sole basis of morality. If "what is good" is
>>nothing more than "what we like", relative success is nonetheless a
>>criterion by which "what we like" can be shown to be superior to "what
>>you like"
[ . . . ]
I think the argument runs as follows:
1. People sometimes find they are uncertain as to their overall
ethical views.
2. When they are uncertain about ethics then, if they are rational
and reflective, they ask themselves what ethical principles they
can't help but accept, or at least feel most strongly inclined to
accept and can't see any sufficient reason to reject, and resolve
their ethical uncertainties using those principles as parsimoniously
as possible.
3. Professor Rorty, at least on Mr. Nilges' reading (I can't speak
of his views from my own knowledge), proposes solidarity with one's
group as an ethical principle that people in fact are strongly
inclined to accept. It appears that consistent with his overall
philosophical stance he accepts no ethical principle that transcends
and limits group solidarity. Conceivably, his acceptance of group
solidarity as a reliable moral principle might simply be based on
the view that man is biologically a social animal.
4. Group solidarity only tells us that whatever we want for our
group we should support, but it doesn't tell us much about what we
should want for our group. Therefore, to the extent we are
uncertain what to want for our group we need further ethical
principles.
5. In accordance with the principle of parsimony, we should first
derive our view of our group's good as much as possible from
solidarity, the ethical principle already accepted. As a factual
matter, the solidarity of a human group is increased by unity within
(_ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer_) and conflict without.
6. The external conflict must have a goal, though. It seems
doubtful that a war undertaken for the sole and explicitly-avowed
purpose of increasing the solidarity of a group would achieve its
intended effect. Nor are material advantages a sufficient or even
worthy goal for war from this perspective, since sacrifice increases
solidarity while peace and cooperation among groups lead to
prosperity and the dissolution of solidarity.
7. Therefore, what is needed is a reason for war that is purely
formal, so as to preserve parsimony and achieve universal
applicability, and that people can't help but find compelling.
Comparative success -- the achievement by my group of its goals
combined with the failure of your group to achieve its goals --
seems to be such a reason. Comparative success means that my group
wants something that exists while your group wants something that
doesn't exist, and I think people do tend strongly to view such a
situation as a demonstration of the superiority of the principles
that define and unify my group (that is, of the ethical principles
accepted by my group).
8. Comparative success would be most strikingly and undeniably
achieved through the successful prosecution of a universal war of
conquest followed by the enslavement, torture and on occasion
annihilation of groups other than one's own. Therefore, an ethic
based on social solidarity would be most perfectly carried out by
preparing for and undertaking such a war and by striving for
perfect unity within the group and self-sacrificing devotion to
its goals.
I should add that the point of the argument is not that Nazism is good,
nor that it is a necessary immediate result of moral relativism, but
only that it is a reasonable conclusion from the principle of making
solidarity with one's group the basic principle of morality, at least if
reasonableness includes a principle of parsimony.
[back to Mr. Deane's post:]
>The writer's basic premise is that both fascism and modern leftism
>reject "transcendent" values and posit instead a world-view based on
>"immanence." The main force of the writer's argument seems to lie in
>blaming the holocaust on those who reject transcendent moral laws.
>Dangerously close to an ad hominem argument, but still an interesting
>book and well worth reading.
Sounds perfectly sensible to me. Read it, Mr. Deane, and learn!
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 11:20:08 EST 1994
Article: 1080 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Strategy and tactics ...
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:19:56 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 14
Message-ID: <2gparc$9po@panix.com>
References: <2gih06$hu6@panix.com> <1994Jan9.012501.15427@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Christopher Lasch, on the other hand, is almost unique in being a
>leftist who is willing to accept some of the illiberal effects of
>community, for the sake of social stability and moral progress.
I wonder how he can continue to be a leftist? It seems to me that on
this issue you're either on the bus or off the bus. Bigotry is not
negotiable, as they say.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 11:27:29 EST 1994
Article: 11371 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:25:47 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 22
Message-ID: <2gpb6b$agr@panix.com>
References: <2g9k9i$bk5@panix.com> <940106.37557.EGNILGES@delphi.com> <940108.77179.EGNILGES@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
EGNILGES@delphi.com writes:
>There may be something prior to "rationality" as opposed to "emotion",
>called rationality+ emotion, and Naziism may offend our sense of
>rationality AND our emotions at one and the same time.
Why not use the expression "the good" for the thing prior to rationality
as opposed to emotion?
>Shakespeare wrote (in The Phoenix and The Turtle) that "love has
>reason, reason none", meaning perhaps in a poem about the
>anti-schizophrenia of a unification of opposites that "love",
>reason+emotion, integrates reason as the "inferior", but
>necessary term.
Some people have spoken of "love" as our mode of apprehending "the
good". What problems do you see with that way of speaking?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 11:29:03 EST 1994
Article: 11372 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:27:17 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 35
Message-ID: <2gpb95$al9@panix.com>
References: <940106.37557.EGNILGES@delphi.com> <2ghppb$d8a@panix.com> <940108.77232.EGNILGES@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
EGNILGES@delphi.com writes:
>Morality is less solidarity with some damn group, and far more the
>willingness to deconstruct group boundaries.
It seems to me that there are problems with this line of thought:
1. Morality requires us to make distinctions in value, so it can't be
reducible to the view that distinctions among things really don't matter
much.
2. What motivates us to act in a way that does not simply benefit
ourselves is largely the thought that others share with us the qualities
for which we value ourselves. Those qualities also define in-groups.
Thus, the motivation for acting morally is necessarily connected to the
existence of in-groups.
3. Since our ability to understand and act is limited, our moral
obligations cannot relate indifferently to everything in the universe.
We will be able to understand and discharge our obligations only if they
relate to situations that are limited and stable enough for us to deal
with competently. To achieve that kind of limitation and stability I
believe our obligations to different particular people must vary. (I
rightly do not view my obligation to my children as identical to my
obligation to all children.) For the sake of reciprocity, an important
moral principle, it seems that the particular persons to whom we owe
particular obligations should also owe particular obligations to us. So
it seems that morality requires that humanity be divided up unto smaller
groups, the members of which owe each other things that they don't owe
to others.
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 13:13:48 EST 1994
Article: 1081 of alt.revolution.counter
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: alt.revolution.counter
Subject: Re: Strategy and tactics ...
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:22:42 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 69
Message-ID: <2gpb0i$a6a@panix.com>
References: <2ghplm$cqa@panix.com> <1994Jan9.015722.15873@news.cs.brandeis.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
deane@binah.cc.brandeis.edu (David Matthew Deane) writes:
>Rush Limbaugh's basic flaw is the same basic flaw of most mainstream
>conservatives: he craves respectability. It is a fatal flaw if one aims
>to change society (I can provide examples if anyone wishes).
Everybody wants to be respectable in the eyes of somebody or other. A
problem in America is that society has always been rather homogeneous,
so that the approval of the broad middle has been the only source of
respect that people have been able to take seriously. The growth of
the mass media has centralized the agencies through which that approval
is formulated and expressed and made it possible for those who know how
to work the system to manipulate it. Maybe the multiplication of
channels of communication is making opinion harder to manipulate. If
so, the question will be what can give it coherence so that it can
become effectual. Most likely, what will give it whatever local
coherence it will have will be sectarianism and the interests of
particular classes (most notably the ruling class), with little
effective communication among opposing factions. So I don't see much
room in the foreseeable future for broad and rooted conceptions of
truth, justice, the public good, and things like that.
>As to the alternatives to capitalism you are forgetting that
>bureacratic inegalitarianism, and non-bureacratic inegalitarianism, are
>also options. Examples of the first: fascism (the corporate state),
>nationalistic versions of the welfare state, "red toryism". Examples of
>the second: feudalism, anarcho-libertarianism, distributism, social
>darwinism.
Mr. Aiken and I were discussing what sorts of things right-wingers in
the United States in 1994 should be emphasizing in public discussions,
so I concentrated on what I take to be the current realistic
alternatives, more capitalism or more bureaucratic egalitarianism. I
agree, since this is alt.revolution.counter, that we should also be
discussing other possibilities.
>The folks at _Third Way_ seem to think they do have a third form of
>society, only they do not have a blueprint, only a set of goals and
>single-issue campaigns to help serve those goals (anti-Maastricht,
>pro-small shops, pro-environment, etc.). They are essentially
>distributist, but, like the distributists, they do not insist on a pre-
>existing blueprint, but have basic goals which they keep in mind when
>engaged in their pursuits.
It seems to me that it's good to know what you're doing, and you're more
likely to know what you're doing if you develop grand theory as well as
act _ad hoc_. The grand theory should include both a sober assessment
of actual conditions and tendencies and an account of how, given those
conditions and tendencies, something better could be achieved.
Otherwise you're likely to end up like left-wing revolutionaries whose
aspirations for unlimited freedom lead them to lay the foundation for
unlimited tyranny.
>I'm of the opinion that social interaction of like minded people is the
>best prevention of pessimism and the easiest way to start a movement,
>but this is rather hard to do through a computer screen, to put it
>mildly. It could be argued that both the American and French
>Revolutions were launched in pubs, saloons, and the like. But all we
>have are publications and the internet. Oh well; here's mud in your
>eye!
You have to start where you are. As Nixon said to Chou En-lai (quoting
Lao-tse), "A journey of 1000 _li_ begins with a single step". If those
three guys agreed on something it must be true. Onward to victory!
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 13:13:56 EST 1994
Article: 11373 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:28:52 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 37
Message-ID: <2gpbc4$arb@panix.com>
References: <2g9k9i$bk5@panix.com> <940106.37557.EGNILGES@delphi.com> <940108.77318.EGNILGES@delphi.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
EGNILGES@delphi.com writes:
>Rorty thinks that systematic ethical critique is silly; and Cora
>Diamond appears to me to believe that one who needs reasons to be
>reasonable, to believe in the existence of an external world, or not to
>be cruel, may even be a defective character, a Bad Hat.
One response is that people's moral outlooks aren't carved in stone.
They shift and can sometimes change radically, especially in times of
social upheaval and among people who aren't self-satisfied and well-
placed. (Such people do exist, and sometimes their views even affect
the course of events.) Within living memory such shifts and upheavals
have ended with many intelligent and well-educated people in highly
civilized societies categorically rejecting "don't be cruel" as a guide
to conduct, with catastrophic results. A living tradition of thought
tying "don't be cruel" to other good things (the possibility of
significant speech mentioned by Mr. Nilges or whatever) could have an
effect on such people if such a situation arose again.
Another response is that "don't be cruel" is not self-explanatory. Does
"cruelty" include every failure to maximize another person's well-being
or failure to give him what he wants? When is it just to inflict pain
against the will of the victim? Who decides and on what basis? Such
questions are much easier to deal with if one has a theory why "don't be
cruel" is a good idea and relating it to other good things. (Any theory
relating "don't be cruel" to other good things could be presented in the
form of reasons not to be cruel.)
As to speculations regarding the existence of the external world -- I
was under the impression that fundamental epistemological speculation
has been helpful in the development of modern physics. Am I simply
wrong on that point?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
From panix!not-for-mail Sun Jan 9 13:14:03 EST 1994
Article: 11374 of talk.philosophy.misc
Path: panix!not-for-mail
From: jk@panix.com (Jim Kalb)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Dinesh D'Souza is wrong on Rorty, Fish, and Derrida
Date: 9 Jan 1994 11:30:27 -0500
Organization: Institute for the Human Sciences
Lines: 17
Message-ID: <2gpbf3$b27@panix.com>
References: <2gl2dk$9de@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu> <2glbm6$2p8@panix.com> <2goi8r$d6k@vixen.cso.uiuc.edu>
NNTP-Posting-Host: panix.com
gbyshenk@uxa.cso.uiuc.edu (gregory m. byshenk) writes:
>Rorty's point is that "cruelty is bad" is the basic premise or axiom
>of his morality. As such, it will (like any other basic premise
>or foundational principle) not "follow from" anything else.
Maybe my problem is that I find it extremely odd to view "cruelty is
bad" as the basic premise of morality. I don't understand what it
could mean. Since life necessarily involves pain, then (assuming
"cruelty" includes the failure to prevent pain) if Rorty had a doomsday
machine that would instantly annihilate all life on earth would he feel
obliged to set it off?
--
Jim Kalb (jk@panix.com)
"Nothing has an uglier look to us than reason, when it is not of our side."
(Halifax)
Back to my archive of posts.